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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SAWAH CULTIVATION 
AND THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT FOR 
IRRIGATION IN WEST SUMATRA
John S. Ambler
di balah balah patigo 
si rauik pambalah rotan 
luhak di baginyo tigo 
adat di baginyo salapan 
nan ampek tabang ka langik 
nan ampek tingga di dunia 
nan ampek tabang ka langik: 
aso bulan, duo mantari, 
tigo timua, ampek salatan; 
nan ampek tingga di dunia: 
rumah gadang, lumbuang bapereng, 
sawah gadang, banda buatan
like rattan a knife has cut 
into thirds,
the homeland is tripartite;
the law is divided into eight;
four flew to the heavens
four remained on earth
the four flying skyward were
the moon and the sun,
the East and the South;
the four staying on earth were
the longhouse and the granary,
the rice fields and the irrigation canals
From L. C. Westenenk, De Minangkabausche Nagari
Introduction
In the late 1970s Indonesia was the world's largest importer of rice. By 1984, it had 
attained rice self-sufficiency. This remarkable achievement was the result of favorable 
weather and a concerted effort on the part of the government to develop rice agriculture 
both on Java, the largest rice-producing area in the country, and elsewhere. West Suma­
tra, as one of the major rice-producing areas outside Java, has played an important part 
in this drive for national self-sufficiency in rice. Average yields for wet rice in the 
province are listed as approximately 4.4 tons per hectare.1 These high rice yields are due 
not only to West Sumatra's favorable climatic conditions for wet-rice cultivation, but 
also to the progressive development of numerous small-scale irrigation works through a 
combination of farmer initiative and government assistance.
Recent efforts to improve irrigation in West Sumatra are only the latest in a long se­
ries of technical, political, and economic developments which have affected agriculture 
there. A number of studies have traced some of these political and economic changes, 
but with the exception of the coffee industry, little attention has been paid to the histori­
cal development of West Sumatra's agriculture, and none has been devoted specifically 
to irrigation. This lacuna is unfortunate, as irrigated sawah has long been the mainstay 
of agricultural production in the darek, the montane cultural homeland of the 
Minangkabau people. Drawing on historical and contemporary sources, this study at­
tempts to give a preliminary history of irrigation in West Sumatra in order to examine 
the roles of the state and of farmers in developing what has today become a highly pro­
ductive rice cultivation system.
1Sumatera Barat dalam angka (henceforth SBDA) 1986 (Padang: Bappeda Tingkat I Sumatera Barat and 
Kantor Statistik Propinsi Sumatera Barat, 1987), p. 176.
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Early History of Rice Cultivation and Irrigation
Oral Legend
Minangkabau legend says that when people began to populate the three luhak of the 
darek (Agam, Tanah Datar, and Limapuluh Kota), wet-rice cultivation was an early fea­
ture of their livelihood.2
dibuek sawah gadang satampang baniah 
makan urang tigo luhak3
they made vast sawah and spread it with seed, 
this was the food of the people of the three luhak
In Pariangan in western Tanah Da tar, according to oral tradition, these early inhabi­
tants established the first Minangkabu nagari (village), an essential Minangkabau so­
ciopolitical-economic-territorial unit. This is presumed to have occurred in the twelfth 
to thirteenth centuries. According to legend, the pre-Islamic nagari needed at a mini­
mum the following:
basawah baladang 
bataratak bapanyabuangan 
badusun bagalanggang 
baitiak baayam 
baanak bakamanakan 
bakabau bakambiang 
batabek taman-taman 
bakorong bakampuang 
bacupak bagantang 
baradat balimbago 
bataratak bakapalo koto4 *
Here the importance of agriculture is clear, as is the distinction between wet agricul­
ture and dry agriculture. While these legends do not allow us to specify the beginnings of 
irrigated agriculture in West Sumatra, they do suggest that irrigation there has both a 
long history and an enduring importance.
wet fields and dry fields 
settlements and cockpits 
neighborhoods and open fields 
ducks and chickens 
children and nieces 
waterbuffalo and goats 
fishponds and gardens 
neighborhoods and villages 
customs, rules 
and institutions 
clearings and water sources
Archaeological and Linguistic Evidence
The historical record is vague about the origins of the Minangkabau and rice cultiva­
tion. Neolithic artifacts dating from as early as 2000 BC have been found in the Kerinci 
area along the southern border of West Sumatra. Later, peoples from China and central 
Indo-China came during a second migration of peoples to insular Southeast Asia around
2A longer version of this legend can be found in Taufik Abdullah, "Modernization in the Minangkabau 
World," in Culture and Politics in Indonesia, ed. Claire Holt et al. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), 
pp. 183-86.
3Idrus Hakimy, 1000 Pepatah-petitih, mamang-bidal, pantun-gurindam (Bandung: Remadja Karya, 1984), p. 
68.
4L. C. Westenenk, De Minangkabausche nagari, Mededeelingen van het Bureau voor de Bestuurszaken der
Buitenbezittingen, Aflevering XVII, 3rd. ed. (Weltevreden: Visser, 1918), p. 12.
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1500-2000 BC.5 These people already had a vocabulary which included huma (cultivated 
field), tebu (sugarcane), alu (pestle), and padi (rice plant).6 These migrants may have in­
troduced dry-rice cultivation to Indonesia.7
Wet-rice cultivation is generally presumed to have been introduced to Sumatra from 
Java by the Hindu-Javanese8 or directly from India, along with the plow, cotton, and the 
spinning wheel*9 The first Hindu settlements on the Sumatran coasts date from 
approximately AD 200.
Early Trade and Political Organization
There are no clues as to the state of rice cultivation until the twelfth to thirteenth 
century when Indian traders entered West Sumatra from the west.10 By the mid-four­
teenth century they had established their own separate political-commercial center at 
Pariangan in the heart of the darek.11 It may be presumed that, at least by this time, irri­
gation was spreading under the Indians, although it certainly could have been practiced 
earlier.
By 1339, the eastern Minangkabau rantau (fringe territories)12 and part of the eastern 
darek had come under the control of Adityawarman, a ruler of Sumatran-Javanese 
parentage with ties to both the Sriwijayan empire in South Sumatra/Jambi and to the 
Majapahit empire in Java. At this time, gold and iron mining were already important in 
the central region of Tanah Da tar,13 suggesting that agriculture may have been produc­
ing a surplus for a non-agricultural population. However, control of the gold trade, not
3R. Heine-Geldern, "The Archaeology and Art of Sumatra/' in E. Loeb, Sumatra, Its History and People 
(Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 305-31. Although Heine-Geldern's "two-wave" theory of 
migration to Southeast Asia is not confirmed, some recent linguistic work supports the thesis (Nordhofer, 
1984, personal communication).
6R. Blust, "Austronesian Culture History: Some Linguistic Inferences and Their Relations to the Archeological 
Record," in Miscellaneous Studies in Indonesian and Languages in Indonesia, Part III, ed. Soepomo 
Poedjosoedarmo (Jakarta: Badan Penyelenggara Seri NUSA, 1977), p. 28. Rice grains dating back 6,000 years 
have been found on Sulawesi. See A. Whitten et. al., The Ecology of Sumatra (Yogyakarta: Gadja Mada Uni­
versity Press, 1984), p. 64.
7Heine-Geldern, "Archaeology and Art," p. 307.
8See L. C. Westenenk, "Opstellen over Minangkabau II," Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en 
Volkenkunde (henceforth TBG) 57 (1916): 254.
9Whitten et al., Ecology of Sumatra, p. 69. However, wet-rice cultivation in Java may predate Indian influence 
in Indonesia. See J. Brandes, "Een jayapratta of acte van eene rechterlijke uitspraak can Caka 849," TBG 32
(1889).
10For information regarding developments before this time, see, inter alia, M. D. Mansoer et al., Sedjarah 
Minangkabau (Jakarta: Bhratara, 1970), pp. 43-44; John Miksic, "Classical Archaeology in Sumatra," Indone­
sia 30 (October 1980): 49; R. Amran, Sumatera Barat hingga Plakat Panjang (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1981), p. 
38.; and E. Edwards McKinnon, "Early Polities in Southern Sumatra," Indonesia 40 (October 1985): 10.
^C hristine Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism in a Changing Peasant Economy: Central Sumatra, 1784-1847 
(London: Curzon, 1983), p. 61.
12Minangkabau culture also predominates in Bangkinang and the upper reaches of the Siak and Kampar 
Kiri rivers, which today lie in Riau but are considered part of the eastern Minangkabau rantau. Both the east­
ern and west coast rantau are more precisely termed rantau dakek, or "close rantau." "Close" here distin­
guishes them from the rantau jauah, or "far rantau" in which Minangkabau would form a minority of the 
inhabitants. Although the rantau was populated by Minangkabau, it was never a colony of the darek. Social 
structure in rantau territories has always been more hierarchical, especially after the subjugation of much of 
the coastal rantau by the Acehnese in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
13Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism, p. 63.
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of agriculture, was the economic bulwark of Adityawarman's rule.14 Although he must 
have been familiar with the concept of irrigation from his experience on Java,15 *there is 
no direct evidence that he promoted irrigation in the darekM  However, the probability is 
high that by the the fourteenth century irrigated rice cultivation was spreading in high­
land West Sumatra under the influence of Adityawarman in eastern Tanah Datar and of 
the Indians in western Tanah Datar.
Whatever their roles in irrigation development, neither Adityawarman nor the In­
dians constituted a centralized authority able to undertake large irrigation works. The 
topography of West Sumatra allows for the development of many small systems and 
does not necessitate large irrigation works with correspondingly large command areas. 
This has enabled irrigation production systems to be relatively independent and small in 
scale, without the need for a large superordinant political structure to organize the con­
struction and maintenance of the physical systems and provide political stability for their 
operation. The decentralized production base in West Sumatra did not encourage the 
development of centralized rule, in contradistinction to Java, and it contributed to the 
viability of semi-autonomous nagari rule. After Adityawarman's death, his weakened 
dynasty appears to have had little control over the administration of nagari affairs.17 Irri­
gation matters were probably handled by the nagari, to the extent that any group beyond 
the irrigators themselves was involved.
Lack of evidence precludes speculation on the state of irrigation during the centuries 
immediately following Adityawarman's time. By the seventeenth century, however, we 
may infer its state in West Sumatra by examining what was happening in Malaya across 
the Straits of Malacca. Beginning in the fifteenth century, significant numbers of mi­
grants from West Sumatra moved to the west coast of Malaysia. Many settled in Negeri 
Sembilan, which in the late eighteenth century was closely linked culturally and politi­
cally with Minangkabau.18
14Ibid., p. 62. Claims that Adityawarman emphasized the agricultural sector (see DPK, Sejarah Sumatera 
Barat [Jakarta: DP&K, 1978], p. 46) are suspect, given that he situated his capital in the heart of the gold-pro­
ducing regions, not in the major rice-producing regions. Note also that the inscription on his gravestone, 
"kanakamedinindra," means "king of the gold-bearing lands." See H. Kern, "Grafsteenopschrift van Koeboer 
Radja," Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indie (henceforth BKI) 67 (1913): 
401—4.
15The earliest known irrigation structure in Indonesia is the Harinjing weir in East Java mentioned in an 
inscription dated AD 804. See Abdullah Angoedi, Sejarah irigasi di Indonesia 1 (Jakarta: Komite Nasional 
Indonesia, International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage, 1985), p. 28. Irrigation systems are also 
mentioned in fourteenth century inscriptions from the Singosari Dynasty in East Java. See T. Pigeaud, java in 
the 14th Century (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963).
15In Saruaso a stone stele from Adityawarman's time was found by the side of an irrigation canal today called 
"Banda Bapahek," "The Chiseled Canal." The inscription has not been translated (See, P. Hardjowardjojo, 
Adiyawarman, Sebuah studi tentang tokoh nasional dari abad XIV [Jakarta: Bhatara, 1966], pp. 21-22), making 
it difficult to tell what relationship this stele may have to the irrigation system itself. Other inscriptions from 
Adityawarman's time deal only with religion, kingship, and genealogy, so it is unlikely that this one deals 
directly with irrigation. Cf. Satyawati Suleiman, 'The Archaeology and History of West Sumatra," Bulletin of 
the Research Centre of Archaeology of Indonesia, No. 12 (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Purbakala dan Pening- 
galan Nasional, 1977), p. 5.
17The rule of the dynasty was most centralized during its first seventy years. In 1409, an expedition sent by the 
Majapahit empire to bring the renegade kingdom to heel attacked the Pagarruyung kingdom. Although the 
Pagarruyung forces prevailed, the attack apparently weakened the monarchic forces and precipitated a re­
turn to primarily nagari rule. See DPK, Sejarah Sumatera Barat, pp. 39-49.
^Considerable numbers of Minangkabau had already settled in the region by the early seventeenth century 
and may have been the dominant ethnic group in the state up to two centuries before that. From 1770 until
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Although at that time, the Malays in peninsular Malaysia planted only dry rice, irri­
gation appears to have been widespread among the Minangkabau migrants in the inland 
valleys of Negeri Sembilan.19 Because neighboring areas (Malacca, Kelantan, Trengganu, 
and Pahang) cultivated primarily unirrigated rice, it appears likely that the irrigation 
technology of the Minangkabau in Malaya was brought over from the darek in West 
Sumatra, not initially developed locally.2® As recently as the late nineteenth century, in 
Malacca it was only the Minangkabau who irrigated rice; the Malaccans themselves re­
lied entirely on the southwest monsoon to water their rice crop.21 Thus, certainly by the 
1700s it appears that irrigation had become such an integral part of Minangkabau culture 
that Minangkabau emigrants transferred it to their new homes as well.
From 1803 to 1833 the darek was embroiled in civil war stemming from a political- 
religious confrontation between a fundamentalist Islamic group called the Padri and the 
more syncretist groups tied to traditional elite families and to the court at Pagarruyung. 
During this period of proselytization by the sword, slave raiding, crop burning, and trade 
route closures were common, suggesting that conditions were temporarily unfavorable 
for cultivating irrigated and non-irrigated fields alike. In some Padri areas, such as Lin- 
tau in eastern Tanah Datar, irrigation development took place under the direction of 
Padri war commanders (hulubalang), but these were only incremental improvements to 
existing irrigation. Christine Dobbin gives an excellent account of the turmoil of these 
years in her Islamic Revivalism. The Dutch, who from the mid-1600s had established 
themselves as traders on the western coast, soon proceeded to subdue the Padri and ad­
vance their own colonial designs. The Dutch territorial conquest of West Sumatra, com­
pleted in 1837, restored the civil stability necessary for productive sazvah cultivation, but 
it carried the price of village autonomy and ushered in the first era of major state inter­
vention in agriculture.
Early Travelers' References to Sawah
The first European to reach the darek was Thomas Dias, a Portuguese emissary in the 
employ of the Dutch governor of Malacca. He entered the region from the east in 1684, 
emerging in Lintau in eastern Tanah Datar after an arduous journey through moun­
tainous jungle.22 Dias mentions gold panning and agriculture as the principal occupa­
tions in Tanah Datar, but gives no details on agriculture, as he was more interested in 
political conditions at Kumanis, the seat of the royal family at the time. His mention of a 
population of 8,000 at Kumanis and of 3,000 armed soldiers sent by the king to see him
1830 Negeri Sembilan was ruled directly by Minangkabau princes sent from the darek. See P. de Josselin de 
Jong, Minangkabau and Negeri Sembilan (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1952), pp. 120-21.
19Mohammed bin Halib, "The State, Rice, and Irrigation: Historical Development and Contemporary Cases 
of Small-scale Irrigation Systems in Peninsular Malaysia" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1985), pp. 
31-45; and J. Jackson, "Rice Cultivation in West Malaysia," Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal 
Asiatic Society 45, 2 (1972): 78-79.
2®For a description of local sawah cultivation, see D. H. Grist, "Wet Padi Planting in Negri Sembilan," Bulletin 
no. 33, Department of Agriculture, Federated Malay States, 1922, p. 1; and Jackson, "Rice Cultivation," pp. 76- 
96.
21 Bin Halib, "State, Rice, and Irrigation," p. 43.
22F. de Haan, "Naar Midden Sumatra in 1684," TBG 39 (1897): 327-66.
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off suggest, however, that agriculture in the region was sustaining a substantial number 
of people even three hundred years ago.23
In the late eighteenth century William Marsden gave descriptions of sawah and padi 
ladatig cultivation in Sumatra.24 With regard to sawah, he mentions that irrigation was 
sometimes used:
Sawahs are plantations of padi in low, wet ground, which, during the growth of the 
crop, in the rainy season between the months of October and March, are for the most 
part overflowed to a depth of six inches or a foot, beyond which latter the water be­
comes prejudicial. Leve marshes, of firm bottom, under a moderate stratum of mud, 
and not liable to deep stagnant water, are the situations preferred; the narrower hol­
lows, though very commonly used for small plantations, being more liable to acci­
dents from torrents and too great depth of water, which the inhabitants have rarely 
industry enough to regulate to advantage by permanent embankments. They are not, 
however, ignorant of such expedients, and works are sometimes met with, con­
structed for the purpose, chiefly, of supplying the deficiency of rain to several ad­
joining sawahs, by means of sluices, contrived with no small degree of skill and 
attention to levels.. . .
. . . Through these apertures [anicuts] water is also, in some instances, introduced 
from adjacent rivers or reservoirs, where such exist, and the season requires their 
aid. The innumerable springs and rivulets with which this country abounds, render 
unnecessary the laborious process by which water is raised and supplied to the rice 
grounds in the western part of India, where the soil is sandy: yet still the principal art 
of the planter consists, and is required, in the management of this article; to furnish 
it to the ground in proper and moderate quantities, and to carry it off from time to 
time by drains; for if suffered to be long stagnant, it would occasion the grain to rot25
The first Westerner known to have entered the darek from the west was Sir Thomas 
Stamford Raffles. In 1818, during the British interregnum in West Sumatra (1795-1819), 
he journeyed inland from Padang to Pagarruyung near Batusangkar.26 Raffles made the 
first detailed observations on the state of agriculture in West Sumatra. Excerpts from his 
diary reveal that he was impressed with the sophistication of agricultural techniques in 
the darek—in this case near Solok:
. . .  we had a gratifying view of the Tiga-blas country, an extensive and highly culti­
vated plain, bounded to the south by the noble mountain of Talang. . . . The whole of 
the plain, or valley, (I hardly know which to call it,) occupied by the Tiga-blas Cotas, 
or Thirteen Confederate Towns, is one sheet of cultivation; in breadth it may be 
about ten, and in length twenty miles, thickly studded with towns and villages, some 
of them running in a connected line for several miles. . . .  On the slopes of the hills, 
the principal cultivation is coffee, indigo, maize, sugar-cane, and the oil-giving 
plants; on the plain below, almost exclusively rice. The sawas, or rice-fields, are here 
managed exactly on the principle of the mountain sawas in Java, and the soil and 
produce seem equally good. . . . The Tiga-blas country has always been famed for its
23Ibid., pp. 341-44. An English account of Dias' remarkable journey can be found in E. Schnitger, Forgotten 
Kingdoms in Sumatra (Leiden: Brill, 1939), pp. 30-31.
24\V. Marsden, The History of Sumatra (3rd ed. 1811; reprint Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 
65-78.
^Ibid., pp. 75-75.
2^See Lady Sophia Raffles, Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles (London: 
Murray, 1830), pp. 339-66.
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produce in gold; indeed to Europeans it has been known as a gold country alone. To 
find it also in a high degree agricultural was more than I expected . .  . many parts re­
minded us of the beautiful district of Serayu, the pride of Java.27
Raffles goes on to paint in glowing terms a picture of Tanah Datar and the southern 
slopes of Mt. Merapi:
The whole side of the mountain, for about fifteen miles from Pageruyong in every 
direction, being covered with villages and rice-fields. . . . The whole country, from 
Pageruyong as far as the eye could distinctly trace, was one continued scene of culti­
vation, interspersed with innumerable towns and villages, shaded by the cocoa-nut 
and other fruit trees. I may safely say, that this view equalled any thing I ever saw in 
Java; the scenery is more majestic and grand, population equally dense, cultivation 
equally rich. In a comparison with the plain of Matarun, the richest part of Java, I 
think it would rise.28
By the early 1800s, shifting cultivation had been replaced by permanent agriculture in 
most of the darek, and the highlanders were said to be quite advanced in the positioning 
of waterworks.29 At this time, the darek was already supporting a large population, and 
its people had achieved considerable fluency in animal husbandry, metalworking, and 
carpentry, as well as in agricultural techniques.30
Summary
Rice cultivation has long been practiced in West Sumatra, and irrigation techniques 
in the darek have been refined over a period of centuries. Because rainfall is abundant, 
the incentive to develop irrigation has not been as high in West Sumatra as in many 
other areas of the world. Nonetheless, irrigation water was still harnessed to supplement 
rainfall during the rainy season, particularly in the highlands of West Sumatra. Because 
of the long history of irrigation in the area, we may, like Marsden and Raffles nearly two 
hundred years ago, assume that irrigators had, long before modern times, achieved con­
siderable proficiency in water management in thousands of small, local irrigation sys­
tems.31
This discussion of the development of irrigation in West Sumatra should not neces­
sarily be extended to include all other areas of Sumatra. Areas with a long history of irri­
gation in Sumatra are generally limited to those located in the Bukit Barisan mountains 
which run the length of the island. Thus, there are examples of sophisticated irrigation
27Ibid., pp. 348-49,351. Emphasis in the original.
2% id .,p p . 359^0.
29A. Pruys van der Hoeven, Een word over Sumatra (Rotterdam: Nijgh, 1864), vol. 2, Sumatra's Westkust en 
Palembang, p. 38.
30Raffles marveled at the ingenuity of irrigation water wheels he encountered and of cattle-powered sugar 
presses, neither of which he had seen in Java.
31Later authors also remarked on the wealth of small streams in the region and the ingenuity of the farmers 
in constructing and aligning canals to bring that water to the desired locations. See, for example, P. Couperus, 
"Aanteekeningen omtrent de landbouwkundige nijverhied in de Residentie Padangsche Bovenlanden," TBG 
5 (1856): 285-312.
technology from mountainous areas in Aceh,32 North Sumatra,33 and parts of South 
Sumatra.34 For many of the flatter parts of the island, however, good water control is the 
exception rather than the rule.35
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The Political and Economic Context for Irrigation Development 
since the Coming of the Dutch (1821-1985)
Economic and political forces bearing on irrigation can be traced more clearly after 
the Dutch occupation of the central highlands beginning in the 1820s. However, many 
details are still unknown and many inferences about the state and processes of early irri­
gation must be made based on what is known more generally about rice cultivation and 
local political conditions.
Beginning with the colonial era, it is useful to distinguish several historical periods 
in West Sumatra: (a) a time of Dutch consolidation of their political and economic con­
trol from 1821 until the introduction of a system of forced cultivation of coffee (the 
koffiestelsel) in 1847; (b) the koffiestelsel (1847-1908); (c) a period of booming commodity 
markets (1908-1929); (d) the world economic depression (1929-1942); (e) World War II 
and the struggle for independence (1943-1950); and (f) the post-colonial years (1950- 
present).
1821-1847: Consolidation of Dutch Power in West Sumatra
Military conquest. Although the Dutch had been active for over 150 years in trading 
for the products of West Sumatra via west coast ports, it was not until the 1820s that they 
began to assume direct control over the countryside. Taking advantage of the civil unrest 
of the Padri war, the Dutch sided with the "traditionalists" and launched a series of 
military expeditions into the darek, beginning in 1822 and culminating in the defeat of 
the last Padri forces in 1837.36 Despite periodic uprisings during the next few years, by the
32See, for example, Pusat Pengembangan Agribisnis, "Seminar Pengembangan irigasi sederhana," Banda 
Aceh, December 13-15, 1987 (Jakarta: Pusat Pengembangan Agribisnis).
33See, for example, R. Lando, 'The Gift of Land" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Riverside, 
1979); J. Keuning, "Over bevloeiingsleidingen (bondars) in de Onderafdeeling Toba," Koloniaal Tijdschrift 
(henceforth KT) 28, 3 (1939): 273-81; and J. Haar, "De 'Panriahan-Pamokkahan' in Simeloengoen," Koloniale 
Studien (henceforth KS) 20,1 (1936): 25-50.
34See, for example, Pusat Penelitian Universitas Sriwijaya, "Pola dan Dampak Bantuan Pemerintah Terha- 
dap Organisasi Irigasi Tradisional: Pengalaman Desa Tanjung Agung, Sumatera Selatan," Paper presented to 
the Workshop on Government Assistance to Traditional Irrigation Systems, Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, 1984.
35A recent study shows that irrigation is now concentrated in West and North Sumatra, Aceh, and Lampung, 
and in parts of Bengkulu and South Sumatra. Rainfed sawah is considerable in Aceh and North Sumatra, 
while tidally irrigated rice (pasting surul), deepwater rice (lebak), and the majority of swamp rice (rawa) are 
found in Jambi and South Sumatra. In Sumatra as a whole, 46 percent of sawah is irrigated, 26 percent is rain- 
fed, 15 percent is swamp and deepwater, and 13 percent is tidal. See, U. Scholz et al., The Natural Regions of 
Sumatra and Their Agricultural Production Pattern (Bogor: Central Research Institute for Food Crops, Min­
istry of Agriculture, 1983), 1:22-28; and 2: map 7.
3^Mansoer et al., Sedjarah Minangkabau, pp. 132-44. In 1821 Dutch officials in Padang obtained a document 
signed by some self-styled nobles from Pagarruyung which ceded the Minangkabau "kingdom" to the Dutch. 
However, this pactum in illicito carried no authority. See Elizabeth Graves, The Minangkabau Response to 
Dutch Colonial Rule in the Nineteenth Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1981), pp. 
35-37.
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mid-1840s West Sumatra was firmly in the hands of the Dutch. During these early years 
the Dutch were more occupied with military and security considerations than with agri­
culture,^7 although in the rice sector they did temporarily ban the export of rice to lower 
its price and the cost of garrisoning troops.37 8
In order to increase military security and to redirect highland trade from traditional 
eastern river routes to the Dutch-controlled west coast, the Dutch built roads linking 
highland towns to the coast. These roads facilitated an expansion of commercial activity 
between the darek and the west coast which could more easily handle bulky agricultural 
products, such as coffee, which the colonial government wished to promote. The up­
grading of the Anai gorge road to accommodate wheeled transport in the 1840s also 
allowed easier marketing of highland rice to coastal markets.39
Early in their administration of West Sumatra, the Dutch began symbolically 
inaugurating the beginning of each year's rice cultivation cycle. Much like the king of 
Thailand who presides over the first breaking of the ground and signals the start of the 
cropping season for his subjects, the Dutch "graced" the annual opening of an irrigation 
system at Pauh near Padang. During his journey in 1818, Raffles had remarked on an 
elaborate irrigation ceremony here, but he failed to mention whether it was conducted 
wholly at the instigation of the people of Pauh, or whether it was done under the aus­
pices of one of the coastal princes.40 In any case, the Dutch began paying for the ceremony 
and took over its leadership. The Dutch Resident (Governor) with a retinue of officials 
and a company of soldiers attended two feasts here, one at the opening of the canal for 
land preparation and another two weeks later when the fields were ready for plowing.41 
The authorities used the occasion to link their administration ritually to rice cultivation, 
so important symbolically and economically to the Minangkabau. Special ritual para­
phernalia with regal overtones, such as a golden hoe, were later added to enhance the 
occasion. The Dutch continued this tradition until the end of the colonial period.42
The encouragement of coffee cultivation. With the depletion of local gold reserves in 
the late 1700s the Dutch realized they would have to seek other resources to make their 
new territory financially solvent. Coffee trade was a logical replacement. Coffee prices 
were attractive, and the well-drained volcanic soil, high rainfall, and cooler weather of 
the highland plateaus and mountains in West Sumatra made it an ideal crop agronomi- 
cally.
Coffee was not the first commercial crop the Minangkabau had grown. They had a 
long history of developing commercial agriculture in response to European market pos­
sibilities: first in pepper in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, next in cinnamon 
(cassia vera) and gambir, and then in coffee beginning in the 1780s.43 Even before their
Dutch Colonial Rule in the Nineteenth Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1981), pp. 
35-37.
37See, for example, E. B. Kielstra, "Sumatra's Westkust van 1819-1825," BK I36 (1887): 8-163.
38Akira Oki, "Social Change in the West Sumatran Village, 1908-1945" (Ph.D. dissertation, Australian 
National University, 1977), p. 39.
39Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism, pp. 213, 232; and T. Kato, "Rantau Pariaman," Journal of Asian Studies 39, 4 
(1980): 743 ff.
40Raffles, Memoir of the Life, p. 344. It may have formerly been attended by the Tuanku Panglima of Padang. 
Cf. S. Muller, Bijdragen tot de kennis van Sumatra (Leiden: Luchtmans, 1846), pp. 159-63.
41Muller, Bijdragen tot de kennis van Sumatra, pp. 159-63.
42See "Pemboekaan Kcpala Bandar di Locb. Begaloeng," Soerat Chabar Pengoesahaan Tanah (hereafter 
SCPT) 10,12 (June 1937): 134-35.
43Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism, p. 35.
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military conquest, the Dutch had been promoting coffee cultivation in the highlands by 
paying a commission to pangulu, traditional family clan leaders, who could deliver cof­
fee to Dutch buyers on the coast.44
Up to 1833, trade in coffee was completely free except for the right to export.45 How­
ever, the colonial authorities disliked their dependence on Minangkabau traders and 
planned instead.to institute a forced cultivation system for coffee, patterned on the cul- 
tuurstelsel program they had instituted in Java for coffee and sugarcane in 1830.46 With 
the subjugation of Sungai Pagu in southern West Sumatra in 1845, the pacification of the 
Minangkabau was largely complete and they began to pursue that plan in earnest.47
Coffee-and rice have different soil and drainage requirements so they do not compete 
for land. They do, however, compete for labor. As a result of their commercial experi­
ence with gold and agricultural products, by the early 1800s the Minangkabau were prob­
ably already paying attention to the issue of returns to labor and evaluating which crop 
should receive the most attention. They still needed to plant sufficient sawah to ensure 
self-subsistence in the absence of fluid rice markets and to maintain the prestige of the 
pangulu, but the Minangkabau were eager to make profits from coffee as well. In the 
early days of the coffee boom some regions pursued both coffee and sawah cultivation 
with equal vigor. For example, a Dutch official remarked in 1844 that Limapuluh Kota 
was not only active in cultivating coffee but also produced a rice surplus for Agam.48
Village administrative reorganization. Before colonial rule the Minangkabau village, 
the nagari, had been essentially autonomous. However, after their first conquests in 
West Sumatra, the Dutch began creating a superstructure of administration which radi­
cally departed from the model of the autonomous nagari.
First, beginning in 1823 each village was provided with its own head, the nagari- 
hoofd. Above the nagari the Dutch created districts called laras, each with its own head or 
larashoofd,4 9  which were formed from clusters of adjacent nagari usually with loose adat 
ties. Laras were combined into regencies, and the regencies into two residencies.50
Second, the Dutch began a process of creating a power hierarchy within the nagari. 
One of the characteristics of Minangkabau society had been an emphasis on shared 
power for all pangulu in a nagari.51 Europeans, however, found this system unwieldly. 
For example, on his journey into the darek in 1818 Raffles lamented having to deal with 
"some hundreds" of equally powerful pangulu merely to get permission for his party to 
cross nagari lands.52 An early Dutch writer wrote, "Many times we have tried to con­
vince the Malays how difficult it was to deal with the suku  (extended family) 
administration and how imperative it was to replace it with a hierarchical multi-level
44Graves, Minangkabau Response, p. 35.
45W. K. Huitema, De bevolkingskoffiecultuur op Sumatra (Wagcningen: Veenman, 1935), p. 59.
45See, for example, Clifford Geertz, Agricultural Involution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 
63 ff.
47Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism, p. 213.
48Granpre Moliere, in ibid., p. 135.
4^Amran, Sumatera Barat, p. 75, n. 63; and W. J. Leyds, "Larasscn in Minangkabau," KS 10, 1 (1926): 398.
50DPK, Sejarah Sumatera Barat, p. 81.
54Strictly this applies only to nagari following the Bodi-Caniago tradition of leadership. Nagari following the 
Koto-Piliang tradition elevate one pangulu above the rest, but even he must make decisions via consensus 
with the other pangulu. Other minor distinctions between pangulu during the early nineteenth century are 
detailed in Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism.
52Raffles, Memoir of the Life, p. 350.
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form of government."53 One observer later expressed the Dutch sentiment well when he 
wrote that "Minangkabau traditional democratic government . . . was not compatible 
with the modern needs of centralization and the creation of a professional cadre of civil 
servants."54
The Dutch found it advantageous to stratify the governance and the elite of the 
nagari to obtain corvee labor for road building and other projects.55 They began to insti­
tute regulations to increase the power of pangulu in administrative positions and to 
separate them from ordinary pangulu. Furthermore, a deliberate effort was made to tie 
the economic fortunes of these pangulu and their lineages to cooperation with the 
Dutch. This reduced interlineage competition for pangulu positions and resulted in an 
ossification of the titles, which certain families then monopolized through the genera­
tions.56 Later, beginning in 1888, the Dutch also tried to limit the number of pangulu, 
because the policy of exempting pangulu from compulsory labor precipitated a prolifera­
tion in pangulu-ships.57 This led to considerable disruption in the administration of 
communal lands, because new pangulu could no longer be created to represent new 
family segmentations, and disputes about inheritance and redistribution of land 
abounded.58 From early times, government-appointed pangulu began abusing their new 
powers,59 and abuse of power was to become an even more serious problem during the 
period of forced coffee cultivation.
1847-1908: Mandatory Coffee Cultivation
The koffiestelsel. In 1847, the Dutch unilaterally abrogated the "Plakaat Panjang," a 
document signed by Governor-General van den Bosch during his visit to West Sumatra 
in 1833, which promised that the Dutch government would neither interfere with tradi­
tional institutions nor dictate to whom the farmer must sell his crops.60 In contraven­
tion of this promise they introduced the koffiestelsel, a compulsory coffee cultivation 
and delivery system. Farmers, in all regions with suitable climate and soils, were com­
pelled to plant and maintain coffee trees and to sell the produce for cash at Dutch ware­
houses.61
The success of the koffiestelsel depended on a well-defined village administrative 
hierarchy, which at each level could control lower levels and be held accountable to
53E. Francis, "Korte beschrijving van het Nederlandsch grondgebied ter Westkust van Sumatra, 1837," Tijd- 
schrift voor Nederlandsch-Indie (henceforth TNI) 2 (1839): 128. Translation in F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann, 
'Transformation and Change in Minangkabau," in Change and Continuity in Minangkabau, ed. L. L. Thomas 
and F. von Benda-Beckmann, Monographs in International Studies No. 71 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University 
MIS, 1985), p. 255.
54C. Lekkerkerker, Land en volk van Sumatra (Leiden: Brill, 1916), p. 140.
55Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism, p. 196.
56Ibid., p. 233.
57B. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies: The Selected Writings of B. Schrieke (Bandung: Sumur Ban­
dung, 1960), p. 135; A. van Hasselt, Volksbeschrijving van Midden-Sumatra (Leiden: Brill, 1882), p. 190; 
Lekkerkerker, Land en volk, p. 141.
5%ee F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann, 'Transformation and Change," pp. 259-60.
^Francis, "Korte beschrijving," p. 128.
60An Indonesian text of the Plakaat Panjang can be found in Kementerian Penerangan, Propinsi Sumatera 
Tengah (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1954), pp. 318-22.
6^D. Pies, De koffij-cultuur op Sumatra's Westkust (Batavia: Ogilvie, 1878), pp. 15-16.
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Dutch authorities above. By 1847 the Dutch had succeeded both in pacifying the region 
and in creating this hierarchy.
In 1852 West Sumatra first began to show a net profit for the colonial government, 
mostly due to the Dutch coffee monopoly.62 However, unlike the period of relatively 
free trade before 1847, profits to the coffee cultivators were only one-half to one-fourth of 
the price the Dutch obtained on resale,63 and the government eventually had to use 
coercion to achieve planting and production quotas. Farmers tried to evade work in the 
coffee gardens, while the Dutch and village elites strained to keep them cultivating cof­
fee. The dynamic, market-oriented society of the precolonial era was suppressed as the 
economy stagnated under the koffiestelsel and the former patterns of traditional elite 
fluidity ossified.65 By the 1870s, coffee exports were plummeting, and although the gov­
ernment took such measures as increasing the percentage of the harvest the pangulu 
were allowed to keep for themselves,66 the system had become unworkable because 
farmers refused to tend their coffee trees.
Implications for sawah cultivation. During the 1850s and early 1860s West Sumatra 
was a modest net exporter of rice, in addition to being fully engaged in coffee produc­
tion.67 The Dutch, however, favored coffee because they had monopolized the coffee 
trade, so their profits were greater from coffee than from rice. The Dutch did not encour­
age coffee production to the exclusion of rice production, for sufficient rice production to 
supply subsistence needs was still essential to the success of the koffiestelsel. However, 
low rice prices also spurred coffee production.68 By restricting the rice sector to subsis­
tence levels and insulating it from cash transactions, the Dutch were also able to dictate 
low prices for coffee producers and reap large profits through exports.69 Encouraging rice 
exports would have undermined Dutch control over coffee by providing an alternative 
source of cash for the Minangkabau farmer.
On the other hand, the Dutch did wish to avoid importing rice. As early as 1847 they 
punished farmers who neglected rice cultivation.70 As rice production during the koffie­
stelsel began to fall, the Dutch experimented with rice varieties and techniques imported 
from Java and the Carolinas.71 However, when West Sumatra became a rice importer in
62"De financieele resultaten van het bestuur der Buitenbezittingen van 1839 tot 1862," lndische Gids 
(henceforth IG) 33a (1890): 1337.
63Prices for coffee realized by the Dutch exceeded those paid to coffee producers by an ever-increasing mar­
gin throughout the koffiestelsel. See U. Scholz, Minangkabau: Die agrarstruktur in West-Sumatra und 
moeglichkeiten ihrer entzoicldung (Geissen: Geographsischen Instituts der Justus Liebig-Universitaet, 1977), p. 
56; and Amran, Sumatera Barat, p. 350.
6^Graves, Minangkabau Response, pp. 63-65.
65See F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann, 'Transformation and Change"; and J. Haggis et al., "By the Teeth: A 
Critical Examination of James Scott's The Moral Economy of the Peasant," World Development 14, 12 (1986):
1435-55.
^Huitema, De bevolkingskoffiecultuur, p. 59.
J. Veth, Aardrijkskundig en statistisch woordenboek van Nederlandsch Indie (Amsterdam: Van Kampen, 
1869), 3:732.
^Couperus, "Aanteekeningen," p. 304.
^ See, for example, Joel Kahn, "Commercialization and Change in Minangkabau," in Change and Continuity 
in Minangkabau, ed. Thomas and von Benda-Beckmann, p. 283.
^O ki, "Social Change," p. 30. Farmers in Lintau Buo recalled punishments for not following the plakaat 
sawah, such as being paraded through the village while being forced to carry stones on the head. See also 
Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, p. 146.
^Couperus, "Aanteekeningen," p. 292; and, B. van Hoevcll, "Over ijle uitzaaiing van Carolina rijst op Suma­
tra," Tijdschrift voor Nijverheid en Landbouw in Nederlandsch-Indie (henceforth TNLN1) 19 (1874): 130-32.
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the late 1800s, increased Dutch attention to the rice sector was still aimed at ensuring 
adequate harvests to avoid famine, not at developing the potential to export rice.7^
The status of exports of rice from Padang is shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Milled Rice Exports from Padang, 1858-1908
Year Rice Exports 
(yearly average in 
000 metric tons)
1858-1862 3562
1863-1867 2292
1868-1872 52
1873-1877 273
1878-1882 832
1883-1887 5
1888-1892 3
1893-1897 0
1898-1902 0
1903-1908 0
Source: Verslag van den Kamer van Koophandel en Nijverheid te Padang (VKK), various issues.
Note: These figure refer only to the rice trade via the port of Padang. While Padang was the most 
active port on the west coast, rice also moved in and out of the west coast ports of Air Bangis, 
Pariaman, Painan, Air Haji, and Indrapura. Estimates of the rice trade through these ports for the 
years 1907-1911 can be found in J. van Tubergen, Verslag over de Burgelijke Openbare Werken in 
Nederlandsch-lndie over het jaar 1913 (Batavia: Papyrus, 1916), p. 136. Estimating the total rice 
balance in the province is further complicated by the existence of rice exports via eastern trade 
routes. Although these appear to have been very small after the 1850s, they nonetheless should also 
enter into a thorough calculation.
By the early 1890s, Dutch policies had resulted in the complete disappearance of rice 
exports via Padang. Besides low rice prices and forced labor in the coffee gardens, from 
the mid-1800s a series of other Dutch policies also acted to constrain the development of 
the rice economy. One example was an epidemic among draft animals in 1866/1867 
which resulted from corralling them to free pasture lands for coffee cultivation.* 73 The 
ensuing shortage of draft animals for cultivation reduced production and caused a tem­
porary end to rice exports from the region.
77Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, pp. 97-98.
73A. Verkerk Pistorius, Studien over de inlandsche huishouding in de Padangsche Bovenlanden (Zalt- 
Bommel: Noman, 1871), pp. 176-77. As a result of the epidemic, the number of buffalo dropped from 178,00 in 
1863 to about 98,000, while the number of cattle fell from 122,000 in 1863 to about 68,000. See Veth, 
Aardrijkskundig en statistisch woordenboek, p. 707; and Z. Kamerling, "De toekomst van Sumatra," TNLNI 71 
(1905): 502. Lack of pasture for draft animals continued to be a problem into the twentieth century. See Verslag 
van den economischen toestand der inlandsche bevolking, 1924, vol. 2 (Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1926), p. 
197.
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Forced labor for coffee gardens, low rice prices, and a government ban on rice exports 
from West Sumatra also contributed to a drop in rice production.74 Further official dis­
crimination against rice was evidenced by the deliberate inattention to the development 
of eastern transportation links to Jambi and Riau, traditional markets for Minangkabau 
rice, and even the desire of at least one Dutch Resident in the highlands to abolish water- 
driven rice mills because they facilitated the production of a surplus.75 With the opening 
of shipping links between Padang and non-Indonesian ports in 1879, rice could be 
brought in from Thailand, Burma, and Indochina, which undercut local prices.76 An­
other indication of the inattention of the Dutch to Minangkabau rice production is the 
conspicuous dearth of statistics on the production and planted area of rice in West 
Sumatra during the nineteenth century—a time when they were vigorously collecting 
detailed statistics on all crops with an export market.77 West Sumatra would not become 
a net exporter of rice again until the 1910s.78
The koffiestelsel and attendant rice policies affected both highland villages and vil­
lages in the large, flatter sawah plains. Most of the major rice-producing regions, such as 
Ampek Angkek Canduang near Bukittinggi; Guguk and Luhak in Limapuluh Kota; and 
Selayo, Cupak, and Muara Panas in Solok were relatively unaffected by the koffie- 
stelsel.7® However, these areas suffered from the ban on rice export, and many sawah 
fields not needed for household consumption in the rice plains were said to have been 
abandoned at the end of the nineteenth century.80
Probably most directly affected by the koffiestelsel was irrigated agriculture in the 
small valleys surrounded by slopes suitable for coffee cultivation.81 These were areas 
where per capita production of coffee was highest—northern and southern Tanah Datar, 
northern and eastern Limapuluh Kota, northern Agam, Lubuk Sikaping, and eastern 
and southern Solok.82 It is also from these areas that large-scale outmigration was ob­
servable around the turn of the century, when profits for the coffee cultivator under the
74Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, pp. 96-98; and W. A. C. Whitlau, Governor Sumatra's Westkust, 
Memories van Overgave (henceforth MvO) 1926 (typescript), p. 63. Scholz (Minangkabau, p. 58) erroneously 
concludes that the koffiestelsel led to an increase in rice production. It is true that rice imports to Padang, 
which had been a feature of the late 1830s and early 1840s, were no longer necessary by the 1850s. However, 
the improved rice situation in imports/exports via Padang was actually an artifact of the Dutch rerouting rice 
exports from the darek, which had formerly gone via eastern trade routes, to the west coast as they gained 
control of the highlands. Cf. Graves, Minangkabau Response, pp. 70-71.
75Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, pp. 96-98.
76K. R. Young, "The Late Nineteenth-Century Commodity Boom in West Sumatra," Indonesia Circle 22 
(June 1980): 66.
77This bias toward export crops continued into the early twentieth century as well. See De Buitenbezittingen 
1904-1914. Mededeelingen van het Bureau voor de Bestuurszaken der Buitenbezittingen (henceforth MBB) 
10,1 (1915). Despite the fact that West Sumatra had been mapped in great detail during the 1883-1896 topo­
graphical survey and sawah area could have been measured accurately from those maps, there were still 
complaints about the dearth of statistics on sawah and padi ladang area. See M. Joustra, M inangkabau: 
Overzicht van land, geschiedenis en volk (The Hague: NijhofP, 1923), p. 178.
78Ibid., p. 732; and Verslag van den Kamer van Koophandel en Nijverheid te Padang (henceforth VKK), vari­
ous issues.
7^Ples, Koffij-cultuur, Appendices A and B.
80Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, p. 96.
81Some eastern valleys had land suitable for coffee cultivation but grew little coffee because the nearest gov­
ernment bulking depot was too far away.
82Ples, Koffij-cultuur, Appendix B.
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koffiestelsel reached a nadir.83 The labor demands of coffee cultivation and outmigration 
both may have siphoned off labor needed for the maintenance of irrigation systems and 
sawah cultivation.
A more general effect of the koffiestelsel on the Minangkabau was the eroding of a 
society whose social order was based primarily on communally held rice lands.84 The ex­
port crops promoted by the Dutch were planted on land which was individually owned, 
not on communally owned clan land. Profits the cultivator received from the sale of 
coffee, however low, were individually held and not subject to the customary restrictions 
which applied to most communal property.85 This contributed to an individualization 
of production processes and a partial turning away from communal production activities 
such as sawah cultivation.86
Irrigation development during the koffiestelsel. By the 1850s only limited expansion 
of sawah was possible in the darek.87 One author noted that by this time very few dry-rice 
fields still existed in most areas of the Padang highlands and almost all rice agriculture 
was either irrigated or rainfed sawah.88 Most of the potential irrigation in the darek had 
already been developed.
Irrigation development was more active in the coastal regions during this time. An 
1863 government report on rice cultivation in West Sumatra noted that rainfed sawah 
(sawah tadah hujan) was increasingly being converted to irrigated sawah, and an 1860 re­
port mentioned that in Pariaman and Ulakan north of Padang new canal-building activ­
ity peaked that year.89 This, however, was a region unsuitable for coffee cultivation and 
population concentrations in the area were fairly recent phenomena.
In Java, irrigation canals had been constructed under government programs as early 
as the mid-1700s and large irrigation works were already being developed by the 1830s, 
first under the direction of the Ministry of the Interior (Binnenlandsch Bestuur) and, be­
ginning in 1854, under the direction of the newly formed Department of Public Works, 
the Departement der Burgerlijke Openbare Werken (BOW).90 Many of the large hy­
83M. Naim, "Merantau: Minangkabau Voluntary Migration" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Singapore, 
1973), p. 122.
84Oki, "Social Change," p. 30.
85Joel Kahn, "Economic Scale and the Cycle of Petty Commodity Production in West Sumatra," in Marxist 
Analyses and Social Anthropology, ed. M. Bloch (New York: Wiley, 1975), p. 82.
86For more detail, see Graves, Minangkabau Response.
8^Couperus, "Aanteekeningen," p. 294.
88Ibid., p. 286. See also, G. de Waal, "Aanteekeningen betreffende de rijstkultur op sawah's in de onder- 
afdeeling Limapoeloeh Kota der Residentie Padangsche Bovenlanden," TBG 30 (1885): 391.
89Veth, Aardrijkskundig en statistisch woordenboek, p. 731. Unfortunately, no details are given as to what 
involvement the government may have had in this activity.
90In 1935 the BOW changed its name to the Departement van Verkeer en Waterstaat. For histories of irriga­
tion development in Java, see: J. Haringhuizen and A. Nyman, Irrigation in Netherlands East India, Nether- 
lands-East-Indian San Francisco Committee, Department of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, no. 12 
(The Hague: van Dorp, 1914); "Bevloeiingen," in Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-lndie, vol. 1 (The Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1917), pp. 289 ff.; "Het irrigatiewezen in Nederlandsch-lndie," in Mededelingen der Regeering 
omtrent enkele onderwerpen van algemeen belang, June 1930, pp. 94-118; J. Metzelaar, "Irrigatie," in De 
landbouw in den lndischen Archipel, vol. 1, ed. C. J. van Hall and C. van de Koppel (The Hague: van Hoeve, 
1946), pp. 201-38; H. Vlugter, "Honderd jaar irrigatie," De Ingenieur in Indonesia 7 (1949): 99-105; and 
Angoedi, Sejarah Irigasi.
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draulic works on Java built in the mid-nineteenth century were designed to increase 
sugar output under the forced cultivation system.91
In West Sumatra, however, the Dutch made no direct engineering investment in 
irrigation during the nineteenth century, possibly because of the more limited potential 
of the region for irrigated export crops. The Government of West Sumatra had no irriga­
tion engineers a t its disposal during this time and no plans for irrigation development, 
other than through exhorting local leaders to extensify irrigated rice area to meet the 
subsistence needs of the population. All planning, construction, operation, and mainte­
nance of irrigation systems was left in the hands of the farmers themselves.
The Dutch did, however, indirectly influence irrigation at this time by encouraging 
the timely cleaning of canals and planting of rice in each district. As early as the mid- 
1800s, they developed planting timetables known as plakaat sawah.92 The major reason 
for the plakaat sawah appears not to have been as a possible means of regulating water 
distribution among irrigation systems located along the same rivercourse, but rather to 
ensure that all arable land was indeed planted, and to minimize pest damage through 
simultaneous planting. In spite of the plakaat sawah, the Dutch blamed poor mainte­
nance of irrigation weirs, high turnover among Dutch supervisory officials,93 and forcing 
farmers to plant fields which they had little interest in cultivating94 as the causes of the 
rice shortages in the late nineteenth century. These, however, were only proximate 
causes stemming ultimately from official discrimination against rice in favor of coffee. It 
was not until the creation in 1905 of the Ministry of Agriculture (Departemen van Land- 
bouw) that a government organ had the specific mandate to attend to improving food 
crop production and not solely to developing export crops.95
1908-1929: Laissez-faire Cultivation Policy
The lifting of the koffiestelsel and increased integration into the world economy. In 
1908 the Dutch formally abandoned the koffiestelsel and allowed farmers to plant any 
crops they wished. Crops could be sold at prevailing prices to any private trading con­
cerns. To raise revenues under this new system, a direct taxation system was intro­
duced96 which occasioned a minor rebellion in several highland areas in 1908.97 Despite 
the hardship the monetary tax imposed, the privatization of commodities markets and 
the abolition of forced cultivation and delivery systems did open new economic oppor­
91Angoedi, Sejarah Irigasi, pp. 109,116.
97The plakaat sawah may have been instituted during the term of Resident Steinmetz (1837-1848), but the 
earliest remaining example dates from September 15, 1863 for 1863/64 for the Padang Highlands. See W. 
Frijling, "Bestuurscontrole op de inlandsche rijstcultuur ter Sumatra's Westkust," Tijschrift voor het Binnen- 
landsch Bestuur (henceforth TBB) 52 (1917): 95-97.
93"Rijstschaarsche en koffiecultuur in de Padangsche Bovenlanden," IG 26, 2 (1904): 1898.
94C. Lulofs, "Naschrift van de redactie," TBB 51 (1917): 77.
95Angoedi, Sejarah Irigasi, p. 108.
96The taxes were a 2 percent income tax on adult men, plus a slaughter tax. Corvee labor was also still re­
quired for public works projects. Later, in 1915, under the Nagari Ordinance, customary dues collected by the 
nagari, such as occasional labor service (sarayo) or occasional money contributions (iuran urang), were de 
facto converted into regular government taxes. See Akira Oki, "Economic Constraints, Social Change, and the 
Communist Uprising in West Sumatra (1926-1927)," in Change and Continuity in Minangkabau, ed. Thomas 
and von Benda-Beckmann, pp. 213, 220.
97DPK, Sejarah Sumatera Barat, pp. 84-86.
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tunities. The Minangkabau responded to higher profits from coffee and to new crops 
such as rubber and cloves.
Rice production also rebounded after the ban on rice exports from West Sumatra was 
rescinded in 1912.98 *In his inaugural address, Governor Ballot stressed that three things 
were important in rice cultivation: (1) the timely planting in accordance with the onset 
of the monsoon; (-2) the drying out of the fields during the dry season; and (3) non-inter­
ference with the farmers' choices in the marketing of the crop ." West Sumatra again 
became a net exporter of rice,100 although the Dutch themselves disagreed as to whether 
this was primarily due to the lifting of restrictions on the rice trade or to a reinforcement 
of the plakafit saxvah regulations.101 Food crop production was also supported by the 
establishment in 1916 of the Agricultural Extension Service (Landbouwvoorlichtings- 
dienst).102 Table 2 shows the status of rice imports and exports via Padang during the 
period 1909-1928.
Table 2. Annual Milled Rice Exports and Imports, Padang, 1909-1928 
(Based on five-year average)
Year Exports 
(000 tons)
Imports 
(000 tons)
Net Flow 
(000 tons)
1909-1913 3600 211 +3389
1914-1918 8965 5484 +3481
1919-1923 2866 3729 -863
1924-1928 3238 2295 +943
Source: VKK, various issues.
During the 1920s, rice exports roughly balanced imports, production keeping pace 
with population growth. However, we must not overestimate production in West 
Sumatra, for up to half of the rice exports from Padang after 1922 originated from the 
Kerinci area, which was directly subsumed under the administration of West Sumatra 
after the completion of the connecting road to Padang in 1921.103 Taking this into
"Statistics anomalously show some rice export during 1910 and 1911 before the lifting of the ban. See VKK 
(1925), Appendix 2.
" i n  Joustra, Minangkabau, p. 180.
100VKK (1925), Appendix 2; and M. B. Smits, "Nog eens de rijstproductie ter Sumatra's Westkust," TBB 51 
(1917): 514-15.
101See, W. Steinbuch, "Bestuurscontrole op de inlandsche rijstcultuur ter Sumatra's Westkust," TBB 51 
(1917): 67-74; and Smits, "Nog eens de rijstproductie," pp. 513-14. Frijling, "Bestuurscontrole," p. 97, claimed 
that the plakaat sawah never really fell into disuse. Nevertheless, it is apparent from Steinbuch's account that 
there was a tension between the Dutch administration and the farmers, who wanted to plant according to 
their own schedule—often so that harvest would coincide with the fasting month and the zakat (religious tax) 
could thus more easily be paid (Smits, "Nog eens de rijstproductie," p. 514). Another account says that gov­
ernment enforcement of the plakaat sawah was making farmers plant fields against their will and was causing 
bad harvests. See Lulofs, Naschrift van de redactie, p. 77.
102joustra, Minangkabau, p. 79.
103Oki, "Social Change," pp. 43-46,161. Kerinci was under the indirect administration of the governor of West 
Sumatra from the time of its military occupation by the Dutch in 1903 until 1922, when it formally became part 
of West Sumatra.
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account, the area of present-day West Sumatra appears to have been a net importer of 
rice, as farmers took advantage of the high prices for cash crops during the 1920s.
The large expansion of the copra industry in Pariaman in the 1880s and 1890s, the rise 
of tobacco and gambir as commercial crops in the darek, the introduction of Robusta cof­
fee in the highlands in 1915, and the rapid of spread of rubber in 1920, especially in out­
lying districts,10? not only increased production for the market, but also heightened the 
vulnerability of the Minangkabau farmer to the vagaries of world prices. This was espe­
cially true in the minor depression during the First World War and in the recession 
immediately following.* 105 Such was the state of monetization of the economy that in 
Alahan Panjang, one of the poorest and least monetized rural areas in West Sumatra, 
the proportion of cash income to total income in 1926 was over 66 percent.106 However, 
because cash cropping had already been practiced for some time, the increased monetiza­
tion of the economy after 1912 may not have been the watershed Schrieke believed, but 
rather only an intensification of patterns already begun decades earlier.107
Rice versus other agricultural commodities. Rice agriculture had to compete for labor 
with coffee and other export crops. In 1927, coffee was again the most important export 
from Padang,108 and again, highland fields were turned over to export crops, often at the 
expense of pasture land needed for draft animals used in sawah cultivation.109
High prices for export crops during the 1920s encouraged farmers in outlying areas to 
switch from dry rice to cash crops. This was most pronounced in Indrapura and Tapan in 
southern Pesisir Selatan, in the Muara Labuh valley, and in Lubuk Sikaping.110 The 
slope and good drainage of most dry-rice fields made them highly suitable for the cash 
crops popular during this period. The heavy clay soils of many of the ancient sawah 
lands were ill-suited for these commerical crops and remained under sawah cultivation. 
During this time, only a moderate expansion of sawah took place, again mostly in coastal 
areas.111
Akira Oki makes an important point about the 1920s in West Sumatra with his ob­
servation that outlying areas were able to concentrate on cash-crop production precisely 
because the darek was able to produce a rice surplus.112 Rice production in the darek was 
spurred by higher prices, and marketing was facilitated by Dutch programs to expand and 
improve the road network. West Sumatra was developing a regional division of crop 
specialization in which the darek and outlying areas were joined in tighter economic 
interdependence.
10^See Young, "Late Nineteenth-Century Commodity Boom," pp. 65-67; and M. B. Smits, Over den lattdbouw 
in Nederlands-IndiS (Groningen: Wolters, 1929), p. 142.
105Kamar, in Oki, "Economic Constraints," p. 223.
106Schrieke, in ibid., p. 216.
107Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, pp. 99 ff. Other sources also show there was a movement from a 
subsistence economy to a monetized economy at least two decades before the lifting of the koffiestelsel in 
1908. See Oki, "Economic Constraints"; Kahn "Commercialization and Change"; and Young "Late Nine­
teenth-Century Commodity Boom."
108Huitema, De bevolkingskoffiecultuur, p. 63.
109 y ersiag van fen  economischen toestand der inlandsche bevolking, 1924, vol. 2 (Weltevreden: Lands- 
drukkerij, 1926), p. 197.
110Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, pp. 101-4.
111In 1908-1909 an estimated 1300 ha of new sawah were created in the Pariaman and Kayu Tanam districts 
near the coast (Joustra, Minangkabau, p. 178). Modest expansion of sawah was also later reported in Pariaman 
and Painan. See Jaarsverslag van den Landbouwvoorlichtingsdienst 1919, p. 300.
112Oki, "Social Change," pp. 62-64. Again, the surpluses from Kerinci played a key role here.
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Irrigation development (1908-1929). The power of the pangulu and other traditional 
elites was primarily based on sawah, not dry cropland. This power base was again diluted 
during the 1920s by the increasing importance of cash cropping on non-sazoah lands.113 
However, during this time the pangulu did begin to benefit from Dutch interest in 
actively improving sawah through measures such as irrigation development.
With the collection in 1907 of data on existing irrigation works, improvements con­
sidered necessary, and possibilities for extensions or new works, the Dutch for the first 
time began to pay specific attention to irrigation outside Java and Madura. This report, 
however, was considered unsatisfactory, and from 1910 to 1912 engineers conducted 
inquiries into irrigation on Sumatra and Sulawesi. The reports in 1914 of Ir. van Tuber- 
gen for Sumatra and Ir. van Buuren for Sulawesi led to the appointment of eight engi­
neers outside Java to plan and execute simple irrigation and drainage works.114 One of 
these engineers, J. van Tubergen, was assigned to West Sumatra,115 and the budget pro­
posed for the irrigation service in West Sumatra ranked highest of all the Dutch territo­
ries in Sumatra.116
The van Tubergen report was instrumental in charting the course of government 
irrigation development plans in Sumatra. According to the report, the first priority was 
the construction of new works for opening up new land and for converting rainfed lands 
into irrigated lands.117 In West Sumatra, because much of the potential irrigable land was 
already being irrigated, development of new irrigation works would be largely confined 
to outlying areas, such as Pasaman.118
Of secondary importance, according to the report, was the rehabilitation and im­
provement of existing works. Regarding this, the report reached several important 
conclusions:
(1) Improvements in existing systems will have more effect on lessening the labor 
burden for system maintenance and on reducing interruptions in water flow, rather 
than on increasing rice production itself.
(2) It will be difficult to levy irrigation fees on the farmers in government-assisted 
systems because it will be difficult to show improvement in rice yields. More efficient 
methods of water management, however, should be introduced.
(3) The improvement of existing systems should be executed with corvee or com­
munal labor, with cash payments borne as much as possible by those who benefit.
(4) The improvement of existing systems should take care not to disadvantage other 
existing downstream systems.
113Ibid., p. 131.
114De Buitenbezittingen, 1904-1914, p. 58.
115Haringhuizen and Nyman, Irrigation in Netherlands East India, p. 71. The other engineers were placed in 
Aceh, Bengkulu, Palembang, Bali, Sulawesi, and Menado. In West Sumatra the irrigation service initially had 
its own engineer. By the 1920s, however, it was taken over by the BOW, the department of public works. See 
Whitlau, MvO, 1926, p. 89.
l l 6 J. van Tubergen, "Verslag nopens een ingesteld irrigatie-onderzoek op Sumatra," in Verslag over de 
burgerlijke openbare werken in Nedelandsch-Indie over het jaar 1916, Pt. 5: Irrigatie, waterafvoer en water- 
keering, App. I (Batavia: Papyrus, 1916), p. 172.
117Ibid., p. 10.
118Ibid., pp. 146-51.
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(5) The operations and maintenance of small irrigation systems should be left in the 
hands of the farmers.
(6) The Dutch government should play a role in the coordination of water allocation 
and distribution among systems located along common rivercourses.
(7) Any intervention in existing works must be done with the utmost circumspection 
and consideration of the consequences. Pre-intervention preparation must include 
drawing good irrigation maps, including the main canals and the command areas for 
each canal.119
Thus, the report was clearly aware that small-scale irrigation systems were extensive, 
quite efficient at producing good rice yields, and should only be improved after careful 
consideration of the consequences. Farmers were to be involved in the rehabilitation of 
such works. While mobilization of corvee labor, for instance, cannot be considered a 
participatory approach, it is clear that the Dutch were attempting to elicit a contribution 
from the farmers in terms of labor, money, and materials. The reason behind this was to 
minimize government expenditure, but it was also consistent with current theories 
about the importance of contributions from farmers for the development of property 
rights and for encouraging the sense of ownership necessary for continued maintenance. 
The Dutch were not pursuing a direct investment policy which emphasized state plan­
ning and execution of small irrigation works without any farmer involvement.
After publication of the report, officials and businessmen who had for some years 
remarked on the necessity of improving irrigation works in the province, were initially 
enthusiastic about the measures proposed there for increasing rice output.120 However, 
compared to Java there was in West Sumatra at the time little corvee labor available for 
village roads, canals, and other public works, and most Dutch-organized labor was spent 
on road construction and repair, not on irrigation.121
As the van Tubergen report had predicted, the irrigation work the Dutch began out­
side Java in these early years was "of minor importance,"122 and consisted primarily of 
improving existing village irrigation wiers (bevolkingstuwdammen) rather than con­
structing new ones.123 While the government made some funds available for these 
improvements, the projects were ". . . executed with the aid—as far as possible—of 
'compulsory labour/"12^
Farmers in Indonesia were not assessed directly for any improvements in irrigation 
systems.125 While farmers in Java had to pay indirectly for these improvements because 
the land tax was based on yields,126 those in West Sumatra paid nothing because there 
was essentially no land tax.127 In 1922 the Dutch tried to institute a land tax, but opposi­
119Ibid., pp. 10-14,43,139,144-45.
120r a :  (1920): 10-11.
121F. van Ginkel, "De economische toestand en de bclastingdruk met betrekking tot de inlandsche bevolking 
van Sumatra's Westkust/' Rapport van de Commissie van Onderzoek, vol. 2 (Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 
1928), p. 126.
l^Haringhuizen and Nyman, Irrigation in Netherlands East India, p. 71.
123See VKK (1910-1916).
l^Haringhuizen an(j Nyman, Irrigation in Netherlands East India, p. 71.
* 23Cf. M. B. Smits, Over den landbouw, pp. 63-64.
l^ F o r  Java, see J. Klaveren, The Dutch Colonial System in the East Indies (Rotterdam: Benedictus, 1953), pp. 
172-73.
2^2In fact, there was a small ground tax (verponding), but realization of revenues from this source were negli­
gible. See van Ginkel, "Economische toestand," p. 24. One source mentions that "rubber money"—funds
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tion was so strong that implementation of the tax was delayed and, in 1923, aban­
doned.128
In general, the Irrigation Service of the Dutch government, the Dienst Irrigatie, had 
three tasks at this time: (1) . . the planning and execution of new irrigation works,
including technical management and water division in those irrigated areas; (2) the im­
provement of existing indigenous works and the assumption of regular management in 
those works; and (3) the provision of information and assistance for the construction or 
improvement of very small works."129 In West Sumatra the Dutch were primarily con­
cerned with the larger of the irrigation projects they undertook,130 and they assumed 
main systejn management of some of the larger of the previously farmer-managed sys­
tems,131 allowing the farmers to manage water at the tertiary level. In very small systems 
the Dienst Irrigatie placed no personnel at all, leaving the systems entirely in the hands 
of the farmers after the construction or rehabilitation of the irrigation works was com­
pleted. In general, for the areas outside Java and Madura, the government saw greater 
potential for building "scientifically constructed" small irrigation works rather than 
developing large irrigation facilities.132
Dutch observers felt there was a general lack of formal water users' associations in 
West Sumatra, especially as compared to Bali.133 One study recommended the formation 
of "interest groups for irrigation purposes" ("belangengemeenschappen voor be- 
vloeiingsdoeleinden"),134 and early in the period of direct government irrigation assis­
tance there was some talk of forming water-users' associations (waterschappen) in the 
Padang environs and in Agam.135 However, this apparently was not pursued, except 
possibly for the strengthening of a traditional irrigation leader called the tuo banda. In 
any case, despite their lack of formal irrigation associations, Minangkabau farmers were 
noted for being good irrigators and rice cultivators.136
In general, however, the Dutch appeared to be half-hearted in developing both the 
physical and social infrastructure for irrigation in West Sumatra. Indeed, the delay in 
executing long-planned irrigation works was one of the criticisms Schrieke made in his 
1927 report on the social and economic bases of Communist activity in West Sumatra.137
somehow collected through the taxation or marketing of rubber—were used to finance some small irrigation 
improvements designed by the government. Unfortunately, this financing system is not explained. See VKK 
(1938): 72.
128Abdullah, "Modernization in the Minangkabau World," pp. 148 ff.; Oki, "Social Change," p. 92.
129Smits, "Over den landbouw," p. 63.
130"Dari Hal Pengairan," SCPT11,9 (March 1938): 103.
131 For example, Bdr. Kuranji (Bdr. Gunung Nago) near Padang; Bdr. Lampasi in Limapuluh Kota; and Bdr. 
Galo Gandang in Tanah Datar. See Asnawi et al., Sebuah studi perbandingan tentang sistem-sistem 
manajemen irigasi untuk padi sawah di Sumatera Barat (Padang: Universitas Andalas, 1984), pp. 104-5, 146- 
47; and R. J. S. Schafer (Controleur, Fort van der Capellen), MvO, 1935, Appendix X.
132"Het irrigatiewezen in Nederlandsch-Indie," p. 118.
133For example, see C. D. Willinck, I let rechtsleven bij de Minangkabausche Maleiers (Leiden: Brill, 1909), p. 
684.
131 Van Ginkel, "Economische toestand," p. 126.
135See VKK (1914): 27.
136See, for example, M. B. Smits, "Enkele bijzonderheden van de rijstkultuur ter Sumatra's Westkust," 
Tevsmannia 26 (1916): 625.
137B. Schrieke, Rapport van de Commissie van Onderzoek, vol. I, Section 2 (Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 
1928), p. 157. It is also interesting to note that the irrigation section in Verslag van de Kamer van Koophandel 
en Nijverheid te Padang disappears after 1916 and resurfaces only in 1935, possibly also an indication of the 
relative unimportance of government irrigation projects during this time.
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In 1928 an irrigation committee was set up for West Sumatra which included 
"Agriculture Council staff," "irrigation specialists," and Minangkabau district and sub­
district heads, but for lack of funds the committee never followed through with any 
comprehensive irrigation planning.138
The World Economic Depression (1929-1942): Return to Rice
Fall in commodity prices. The world economic depression begun in 1929 rapidly 
spread to the Netherlands Indies, and plummeting commodity prices soon sparked a 
retrenchment to subsistence-oriented agriculture throughout the archipelago. West 
Sumatra, too, experienced drastic declines in the prices of cash crops. For example, the 
price of coffee in 1936 was only 15 percent of its 1929 price; copra in 1938 was only 6 per­
cent of its 1929 price; and rubber in 1933 had fallen to only 8 percent of its 1929 price.13^
Rice prices also fell sharply, although not as drastically as those of export crops. By 
1933, the price had fallen to f3.75 per picol (62.5 kg), less than one-third the fl2 per picol 
price before the onset of the depression. Prices stayed very low throughout the mid-1930s 
and only began edging upward in 1937.140 During the depression, local trade declined 
most in the areas where cash cropping had been strongest, although it fared somewhat 
better in the rice centers.141
Rice production. The increase in rice production before the depression had been pri­
marily a rebound from the unfavorable conditions for rice cultivation during the koffie- 
stelsel, and did not represent any real advances in rice production technology. During the 
depression, low rice prices had a particularly dampening effect on rice production. This 
can be seen in rice trade figures for the period 1929-1938 in Table 3.
Table 3. Rice Exports and Imports, West Sumatra, 1929-1938
Period
1929-1932
1934-1935
1936-1938
Yearly Average 
(metric tons)
Exports
984
68
226
Imports
3261
2744
6013
Net Flow
-2277
-2676
-5787
Source: VKK, various issues.
By the mid-1930s, yearly paddy production in West Sumatra was only averaging 
350,000 tons, not much higher than estimated production for the region back in the
138Oki, "Social Change," p. 163.
l39VKK, various issues.
140Ibid.
141Oki, "Social Change," p. 142.
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1850s, in spite of some limited increases in sawah area.142 The poor showing in produc­
tion figures, however, may be a combination of the stored reserves from Kerinci which 
had come on to the market in the 1920s being exhausted, and reduced marketing of rice 
due both to low prices and the need to feed a population swollen by residents returning 
to the villages as their business ventures in urban areas floundered. Finally, in the late 
1930s and early 1940s rice prices rose and the harvest increased to approximately 500,000 
tons of paddy. Even with the better harvests, however, West Sumatra remained a minor 
rice importer.
Irrigation development (1929-1942). With the collapse of the export economy in the 
1930s, the subsistence-oriented shift in the economy favored sawah over other crops.143 
Traditional "leaders began using slogans such as "back to rice" in areas formerly heavily 
involved with export crops. Sawah was worked more intensively during the 1930s than 
it had been during the 1920s, and cases of land pawning, such as Schrieke had decried, 
declined as the role of sawah assumed greater economic importance.144
This renewed reliance on sawah provided an incentive to invest further in irriga­
tion. However, such new investment had to come mostly from the village, as the Dutch 
government had little money to spend on irrigation during the 1930s, with revenues cut 
sharply by the decline in the export prices of agricultural commodities.145 *For example, 
in 1935 the government of West Sumatra requested 150,000 guilders for irrigation pro­
jects in the province but was only allocated 5,000 guilders.145 Compared to Java, Dutch 
expenditures on irrigation in other areas were small.147
What Dutch assistance did come was still predominantly directed toward small-scale 
works and a few medium-scale irrigation works, although Dutch engineers began pro­
viding technical assistance to those nagari that requested help with designing irrigation 
rehabilitation or construction. The responsibility for the costs of all labor and materials 
in such projects, however, rested with the nagari itself.148
Most of the larger irrigation works which the Dutch did build on Sumatra during the 
1930s were not located in West Sumatra.149 These works, which were predominantly 
new systems constructed for Javanese transmigrants in Lampung, Bengkulu, and South
142Average yearly production of paddy for the period 1853-1863 was about 315,000 tons of paddy. See Veth, 
Aardrijkskundig ert statistisch woordenboek, p. 732; and VKK, various issues. Unless noted otherwise, all 
figures in this study represent only the present-day territory of West Sumatra.
l43See, for example, Mohamad Said, "Irikasi atau Pengairan di Onderafdeeling Fort van der C a p e lle n Tani 
5,10 (April 1932): 110.
144Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, pp. 115-16; and Oki, "Social Change," p. 129.
145B. H. F. van Heuven (Resident, Sumatra's Westkust), MvO, 1934, pp. 175-76,199-200. Said, "Irikasi," p. 110. 
Oki ("Social Change," p. 160) shows that government revenues from taxes in West Sumatra in 1935 were only 
40 percent of their 1929 level.
145A. I. Spits (Resident, Sumatra's Westkust), MvO, 1938, pp. 102-3.
147Van der Meulen in A. Booth, "Irrigation in Indonesia, Part 1," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 
(henceforth BIES) 13,1 (1977): 37-38.
148Van Heuven, MvO, pp. 200-202; and C. F. Gonggrijp (Resident, Sumatra's Westkust), MvO, 1931, pp. 112— 
13.
149Examples of Dutch involvement in irrigation in Sumatra can be found in Aceh ("Irrigatie in Atjeh," Deli 
Courant [henceforth DC], April 29, 1930, and "Op reis door Atjeh," DC, October 28, 1932); in North Sumatra 
("De Irrigatiewerken in Simeloengoen," DC, January 28,1935, and M. J. Rotteveel, "Het irrigatievraagstuk ter 
Ooostkust van Sumatra," De Waterstaats-Ingenieur, 8, 6 [1920]: 256-60); in South Sumatra (F. Garot, 
"Onderzoek naar den gunstigsten vorm eener vrije aftapping, ontworpen in de Aer Klingi op Sumatra," De 
Ingenieur in Nederlandsch-IndiS 4, 5 [May 1937]: 79-88); and in Lampung ("Weekrevue," Algemeen Land- 
bouwweekblad voor Nederlandsch-IndiS 16 [October 1931]: 458).
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Sumatra, often consumed more than half of the total budget for irrigation development 
outside Java.150 The Dutch made only very limited efforts to move Javanese farmers to 
West Sumatra, however, and no large irrigation systems for transmigrants were com­
pleted there.151
As trustees of communal sawah, the position of village elites, the pangulu, was en­
hanced by the population's increased reliance on sawah. At the local level, the pangulu 
took the lead in galvanizing irrigation improvements during the depression, sometimes 
even using their personal funds.152 The pangulu took care of seeing to the needs of all 
the nagari inhabitants, both long-standing residents and those returning from failed 
ventures elsewhere. These activities enhanced the prestige of the pangulu, who had been 
under assault by the Communists and "modernizers" (kaum muda) during the export 
boom years of the 1920s.153 The phrase "retain the adat and you will not go hungry" 
supported this relegitimization of the role of the pangulu in the WAgArz.154
During this time there may have also been a re-emergence of "traditional" irrigation 
leaders, usually called tuo banda, although there is insufficient evidence to say whether 
the term predates Dutch times or was created or popularized by the Dutch themselves.155 
Some documents imply that in selected areas, especially around Solok, tuo banda were 
installed on the initiative of the Dutch in an attempt to improve maintenance of irriga­
tion systems and to better coordinate the plakaat sawa/i.156 Dutch concern about the via­
bility of the institution of the tuo banda was another indication of the renewed impor­
tance of sawah during the depression years.
1943-1950: The Japanese Interregnum and the Struggle for Independence
Rice production. During the Japanese occupation of West Sumatra from 1942 to 1945 
rice production fell sharply, due to a combination of lack of male labor and, beginning in 
1944, forced procurement of up to 50 percent of the rice harvest for the Japanese armed
150Some examples in Sumatra of irrigation systems for transmigrants from Java are Way Sekampong (20,000 
ha) and Sukadana (33,400 ha) in Lampung; Perbo (3,500 ha) in Bengkulu; and Aer Komering (12,500 ha) and 
Lubuk Linggau (3,000 ha) in South Sumatra. See the "Waterstaat," in the yearly issues of Indisch Verslag, 
Tekst van het verslag van bestuur en stoat van Nederlandsch-lndie over het jaar (1930-1938) (The Hague: 
Algemeene Landsdrukkerij, yearly, 1931 to 1939).
15lTwo irrigation projects in West Sumatra for transmigrants were: (1) an investigation for a new system in 
Indrapura, near Bengkulu (see VKK [1935]: 82); and (2) a planned extension of the Muara Mais canal in Desa 
Baru, Pasaman, to irrigate about 1,500 ha. Although families arrived in early 1940, the outbreak of World War 
II forestalled the project. See T. Krimmel et al., "Pre-Feasibility Study for the Bt. Batahan Irrigation System," 
Area Development Project West Pasaman (henceforth ADP), no. 12 (Padang and Eschborn: Bappeda and 
German Agency for Technical Cooperation, 1986).
152Oki, "Social Change," pp. 163-64.
153Taufik Abdullah, Schools and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra (1927-1933) (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971).
154Oki, "Social Change," p. 174.
155I have found no reference to the tuo banda before the late 1920s. This is curious as the Dutch were keen 
ethnographers of the Minangkabau. Either no one examined traditional irrigation systems in detail before the 
1920s, or the title tuo banda was created by the Dutch.
155Isrin, "Sedikit tentang dihidoepkan kembali Toeo Banda' dibagian Solok," SCPT 7,12 (1934): 139; VKK 
(1935): 82; van Heuven, MvO, p. 178.
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forces.157 During the Japanese interregnum irrigation systems received little attention, 
the plakaat sawah was not followed, and the fields were not well tended.158
Similarly, during the struggle for independence against the Dutch (1945-1949), labor 
was often not available in the right places at the right time to produce good crops. Inter­
views with village leaders in several parts of the province indicate that many irrigation 
systems were not maintained after the men fled to the hills to fight the guerrilla war.159 
Much of the burden of rice cultivation was borne by the Minangkabau women, and there 
was little incentive or opportunity to produce rice above subsistence levels. West 
Sumatra continued to require rice imports during the 1940s.160
1950-1985: The Post-Colonial Years
Expansion of sawah area. The years since independence have been marked by a slow 
expansion of irrigated area and a large increase in rice production in West Sumatra. 
Some of this expansion of irrigated area has been achieved through the development of 
new lands, but most of it has been the result of: (a) improvements in irrigation facilities 
enabling rainfed sawah (sawah tadah hujan or sawah banda langik) to become irrigated 
sawah ; and (b) the increase in the cropping index from better water provision and short 
maturing seed varieties. Table 4 shows the development of rice area and the cropping 
index in West Sumatra.
Based on these figures, the expansion in terms of land area committed to sawah dur­
ing the last seventy years has been only about 40,000 to 50,000 ha. As pointed out earlier, 
the expansion that did take place occurred primarily in fringe areas. Figures from 1969 
indicate that almost all land suitable for new sawah was located at the very borders of 
West Sumatra. Tanah Datar in the heartland, for example, showed no possibility of 
sawah expansion.161
There is less information on the proportion of irrigated to rainfed sawah during this 
period. One estimate from the mid-1920s places irrigated sawah in West Sumatra at 
about 137,000 ha with an additional 60,000 ha rainfed sawah .162 In 1986, the area of irri­
gated sawah was listed as 158,000 ha and that of rainfed sawah as 62,000 ha.163 Thus, 
during the last sixty years there appears to have been no change in the amount of rainfed 
sawah but an increase of about 21,000 ha in irrigated sawah . This has occurred through 
the conversion of rainfed sawah into irrigated sawah , especially at the initiative of the 
Dutch and Indonesian governments, and an equal expansion of new rainfed sawah in 
remote areas of the province.
157Kementerian Penerangan, Propinsi Sumatera Tengah, p. 651; DPK, Sejarah Minangkabau, p. 210; and Oki, 
"Social Change," p. 235.
158Kementerian Penerangan, Propinsi Sumatera Tengah, pp. 651-52.
159An example from Pasaman can be found in John Ambler, "Consultant's Report on the Socio-Economic 
Organization of Irrigation in the Batang Kenaikan I Project Area," ADP no. 9 (Padang and Eschborn: Bappeda 
of West Sumatra and German Agency for Technical Cooperation, 1985), p. 19.
160Kementerian Penerangan, Propinsi Sumatera Tengah, p. 651.
161SBDA (1970), p. 58.
162Smits, Over den landbouw, p. 142. The area of sawah in Kerinci has been subtracted from Smits' estimate 
of 150,000 ha for West Sumatra. I have estimated 13,000 ha of irrigated sawah and 3,000 ha of rainfed sawah in 
Kerinci at that time.
163SBDA (1987), p. 196.
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Table 4. Area of Sawah , All Types, West Sumatra, 1918-1985 ('000 ha)
Total Sawah Harvested Cropping
Year (irrigated and 
unirrigated)
Area Index
1918 160 160 1.0 (est.)
1934 197 197 1.0 (est.)
1954 170 170 1.0 (est.)
1970 227 247 1.09
1975 209 263 1.26
1979 210 281 1.34
1985 222 329 1.48
Sources: 1919: Departement van Landbouw, Nijverheid en Handel, Jaarsverslag van den Landbouw- 
voorlichtingsdienst (henceforth /L), 1918 (Buitenzorg: Archipel Drukkerij, 1919), p. 252; 1934: B. H. F. van 
Heuven, "Memories van Overgave/' 1934, p. 174; 1954: Kementerian Penerangan, Republik Indonesia 
Propinsi Sumatera Tengah (Jakarta, 1954), p. 651; 1970: Direktorat Tata Guna Tanah, "Propinsi Sumatera 
Barat, luas penggunaan tanah kecamatan, 1977/' Publikasi No. 91, Jakarta; 1975-85: Sumatera Barat 
Dalam Angka, various issues.
Notes: The figure for 1918 may be an underestimate of "normal" area because 1918 was an exceptionally 
dry rainy season and only irrigated sawah could be planted at the usual time; much rainfed sawah was not 
planted at all (JL, 1918, p. 251). The 1934 figure listed in van Heuven is 213,000 ha, but that includes Kerinci 
which was part of West Sumatra from 1922 to 1957. From this figure I have subtracted 16,000 ha, the area 
of sawah in Kerinci as measured from the 1915 map "Schetskaart van de Afdeeling Koerintji van de 
Residentie Djambi, Schaal 1:200,000." This map is contained in Aken, Mededeelingen van het Bureau 
voor de Bestuurszaken der Buitenbezittingen, bewerkt door het Encyclopaedist Bureau, Aflevering VIII 
(Batavia: Papyrus, 1915), Appendix I. The figure for 1954 has been adjusted in a like manner.
Irrigation development. By 1954, government programs had improved irrigation 
facilities for only about 15,000 ha of sawah .164 Although the provincial government gave 
some minor assistance to small-scale irrigation in the form of materials in the mid- 
1950s,165 political turmoil and economic instability prevented any significant rehabilita­
tion of irrigation in West Sumatra from 1950 until 1966. In fact, during that time the 
irrigated area of systems under government management actually decreased from 45,000 
ha to 29,000 ha.166 This problem beset not only West Sumatra, but all Indonesia, as pre- 
1965 governments neglected to maintain irrigation systems.167
The spread of the HYVs. As a major importer of rice, Indonesia was quick to adopt 
modern seed varieties (HYVs) in the mid-1960s, when they first became available. Before 
the advent of this green revolution, all sawah in West Sumatra was only single cropped 
to rice, and usually no unirrigated crop was grown in the sawah. Yet by 1985, the crop­
ping index for all sawah had risen to 1.48. That is, on average, each piece of sawah land 
was being harvested nearly one and one-half times per year. Assuming that rainfed
164Kementerian Penerangan, Propinsi Sumatera Tengah, p. 653.
165Hamzal Gafar, "Community, Bureaucracy, and Hydraulic Networks," Project Report, Cornell University, 
1987, p. 131.
166S. Asnawi and R. T. Shand, 'The Economic Impact of Irrigation in West Sumatra, Indonesia," in Irrigation 
Management: Research from Southeast Asia, ed. T. Wickham (Bangkok: Agricultural Development Council, 
1985), pp. 109-10.
167Booth, "Irrigation in Indonesia, Part 1," p. 51.
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sawah is still only single cropped,168 then the cropping index for rice for irrigated sawah 
alone had reached 1.67 by 1985. Planting a second non-rice crop on sawah is still not 
common in West Sumatra.169
This important increase in cropping intensity has been made possible in part because 
irrigation water is available for modem seed varieties. The long history of irrigation 
development in \Vest Sumatra and its abundant water resources have enabled single- 
cropped irrigated land to move to double-cropped irrigated land with little change in the 
physical structures of many irrigation systems. Furthermore, in formerly rainfed coastal 
areas the new seeds have provided an increased incentive to developing new canal sys­
tems for irrigated sawah .
But the success of the HYVs in West Sumatra also owes much to a good match be­
tween a new technology and a local culture which had reached technological rather than 
social limits to increased production. By the mid-1960s very little expansion of sawah was 
possible in West Sumatra, and, with the varieties the Minangkabau farmer possessed at 
the time, little could be done to improve yields. First the Dutch170 and later the 
Japanese,171 had found difficulty in surpassing the rice cultivation techniques the 
Minangkabau were already using. What was needed to increase production were not 
incremental adjustments to existing techniques, but radically new technologies. The 
HYVs, first developed in the mid-1960s at the International Rice Research Institute in 
Los Banos in the Philippines, provided those technolgies.172
The spread of the HYVs in West Sumatra proceeded rapidly under government pro­
grams aimed at disseminating the seeds, fertilizers, credit, and cultivation information 
needed to take advantage of the genetic potential of the new stock.173
Table 5 shows the coverage of the programs disseminating HYV technology in West 
Sumatra.
168The 1971/72 land use survey in West Sumatra indicated that rainfed sawah was harvested only once a year. 
See K. H. Junghans, Introduction to the Land Use Survey in Sumatera Barat, and Land Use in Sumatera
Barat, 8 vols., West Sumatra Regional Planning Project (Bonn: Institut fur Agrarpolitik, Marktforschung und
Wirstshaftssoziologie, Bonn University, 1972).
169por example, in 1971/1972 total sawah area was 216,245 ha, while the total area of non-rice crops planted in 
sawah was only 18,576 ha. (Calculated from West Sumatra Regional Planning Project, ibid.) Recent drops in 
the price of rice relative to the prices of other crops may now encourage some shifts to non-rice crops during 
the second rice season.
^^See, for example, M. B. Smits, "Enkele bijzonderheden," p. 625. 
l^ O ki, "Social Change," pp. 234-35.
l^ F o r  a discussion of the changes in cultivation techniques with HYVs, see John Ambler, "Management of 
Small-scale Irrigation in West Sumatra, Indonesia: Farmer-managed and Government-assisted Systems in a 
Changing Institutional and Technological Environment" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1988). 
^^These programs had different names, each with a slightly different combination of input, credit, and mar­
keting arrangements. In chronological order, the major rice intensification programs in West Sumatra were 
called: BIMAS, BIMAS Gotong Royong (BIMAS AHT), BIMAS yang disempurnakan, BIMAS Baru, INMAS, 
INMAS Baru, INSUS, INMUM. For descriptions of the early national BIMAS program see, for example, E. A. 
Roekasah and D. Penny, "BIMAS: A New Approach to Agricultural Extension in Indonesia," BIES 7 (June 
1967): 60-69; L. Mears and S. Afiff, "A New Look at the BIMAS Progam and Rice Production," BIES 10 (1968): 
29-47; and G. Hansen, "Episodes in Rural Modernization: Problems in the BIMAS Program," Indonesia 11 
(1971): 63-82.
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Table 5. Harvested Sawah Area and HYV Programs,West Sumatra, 1965-1982
Harvested Sawah Area 
('000 ha)
1965 190
1970/71 247
1972/73 247
1974/75 259
1976/77 253
1978/79 261
1980/81 292
1982/83 300
Program Coverage Coverage
('000 ha) (%)
2 1
64 26
102 41
121 47
162 64
214 82
267 91
297 99
Source: Sumatera Barat Dalam Angka, various issues.
As the table shows, by 1974 almost half of all sawah was included in some rice inten­
sification program, and by 1982 almost all harvested sawah area in the province was 
involved to some extent. Areas which were highly dependent on rice for their main 
source of income, even those located in isolated areas, adopted the new varieties more 
quickly and completely than those areas less dependent on rice.174
As a result of the rapid adoption of the HYVs, West Sumatra has again begun 
exporting rice, predominantly to neighboring Jambi and Riau.175 Using a figure of about 
160 kg per capita annual consumption of milled rice (303 kg paddy) in West Sumatra,176 
we can see that by 1985 paddy production (1,495,000 tons) well exceeded consumption 
(1,135,000 tons) for the 3.74 million inhabitants of West Sumatra, leaving considerable 
quantities available for export.177
Although the program experienced some initial difficulties in conceptualization and 
implementation, the social and economic consequences of the HYVs in West Sumatra 
bear little resemblance to the negative consequences that reportedly sometimes occurred 
on Java.178 Incomes of farmers adopting the HYVs increased relative to those of non­
adopters, despite the fact that production costs with HYVs were much higher.179 As
174A. Benad, Grttne Revolution in West-Sumatra, Bonner Studien zur landlichen Entwicklung in der Dritten 
Welt, vol. 1 (Saarbriicken: Verlag Breitenbach, 1982), pp. 110-13.
17%  Esmara, "An Economic Survey of West Sumatra," BIES 8,1 (1971): 44.
176National average apparent consumption in 1983 was 146 kg per capita (see, L. Mears, "Rice and Food Self- 
sufficiency in Indonesia," BIES 20, 2 [1984]: 126). Apparent per capita consumption in West Sumatra has 
usually been higher than the national average (In 1973 it was 125 kg while the national average was 114 kg. 
Esmara, "Economic Survey of West Sumatra," p. 42 and Mears, "Rice and Food Self-sufficiency," p. 126.).
177SBDA (1985): 61,191. The exact amount available for export depends on the extent of postharvest losses.
178See, for example, A. Schiller, "The 'Green Revolution' in Java," Prisma 18 (1980): 71-94; A. Birowo, 
"Problems of Technology and Employment in Agriculture," Prisma 1, 2 (1975): 36-43; and R. Husken, 
"Landlords, Sharecroppers and Agricultural Laborers," journal of Contemporary Asia 9, 2 (1979): 140-51. For a 
more favorable view of the green revolution on Java, see Y. Hayami and M. Kikuchi, Asian Village Economy at 
the Crossroads (Tokyo and Baltimore: University of Tokyo Press and The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1982).
179Thamrin Nurdin, "Survey intensifikasi padi sawah, analisa musim kering (MK) 1969 di Sumatera Barat," 
Survey Agro-Ekonomi Indonesia, 1970, p. 9; Thamrin Nurdin, "Survey intensifikasi produksi padi sawah di 
Sumatera Barat," Survey Agro-Ekonomi Indonesia, May 1970, p. 15; Muchlis Muchtar et al., "Survey intensi­
fikasi padi sawah, analisa usahatani musim kering (MK) 1969/70 di Sumatera Barat," Survey Agro-Ekonomi
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farmers became more familiar with the new technology their yields and income 
increased further. Significantly, the net result also tended not to alter the existing distri­
bution of income in those areas.180
This favorable result may be attributed to a number of factors. Of primary importance 
is the nature of landholding in West Sumatra. As in many other areas in Asia, larger 
landholders adopted the new varieties more rapidly than small farmers.181 However, 
early adopters were not able to buy up the land of non-adopters using profits from the 
new technology. Sawah in West Sumatra is subject to strict traditional laws and is not 
easily sold by the individual. This meant that, in the early days of the HYVs, those with­
out the resources to take the risks of adopting an as-yet-unproven technology were able 
to adopt a ^wait-and-see" attitude, until government programs were sufficiently devel­
oped for the small farmer to have more equal access to inputs.
Another important reason for the favorable income distribution after the introduc­
tion of HYVs was that they were accompanied by little labor-displacing technology in 
West Sumatra. Mechanization of land preparation has been for the most part impractical 
on sawah because of the steep terraces in many of the principal rice-producing districts. 
Harvest technology has also not changed. On Java, a small blade cupped in the hand 
called an ani-ani was used to harvest rice in a very labor-intensive fashion. After the 
introduction of the HYVs this was often replaced by the less labor-intensive sickle.182 In 
West Sumatra there was a version of the ani-ani, locally called the tuai, but its use was 
generally restricted to padi ladang, unterraced rainfed rice, and the sickle had been in 
general use for harvesting sawah long before the introduction of HYVs. As a result, the 
total demand for labor in West Sumatra rose dramatically with the larger harvests and 
the greater number of harvests per year,183 turning some areas previously afflicted with 
surplus agricultural labor into labor-deficit areas.184 Mechanization in the rice-produc­
tion cycle has most commonly been in the form of simple threshing machines. These 
have developed in response both to the larger harvests and because less time is available 
for threshing, now that farmers are eager to begin soaking their land again and preparing 
for a second crop.
In the last three years, however, with the achievement of self-sufficiency in rice in 
Indonesia, rice prices have been unstable and often low, and rice farmers all over the 
country face new difficulties in earning a living from sawah . The impact of this on the 
construction, operation, and maintenance of irrigation systems in West Sumatra is not 
yet clear.
Recent irrigation development. Since 1966, the Indonesian government has pro­
moted rice agriculture by every available means, including the construction of new irri­
Indonesia, July 1971, p. 10; Muchlis Muchtar, "Intensifikasi padi sawah musim tanam 1974 dan 1974/75 pada 
dua Kabupaten di Sumatera Barat," Survey Agro-Ekonomi Wilayah Sumatera Barat, 1975, pp. 9,11.
180P. Deuster, "The Green Revolution in a Village of West Sumatra," BIES 18,1 (1982): 86-95.
181Benad, Griine Revolution.
182See, for example, W. Collier et al., "Tebasan System, High Yielding Varieties and Rural Change: An Exam­
ple from Java," Prisma 1,1 (1975): 17-35; and Y. Hayami and A. Hafid, "Rice Harvesting and Welfare in Rural 
Java," BIES 15,2 (1979): 94-112.
183Bonad, Griine Revolution, p. 89.
184During my fieldwork in Lintau, Tanah Datar, farmers mentioned that before the HYVs they used to go to 
Limapuluh Kota to work as agricultural laborers after their own harvest. Now, with the HYVs and multiple 
cropping, they stay at home and actually must import labor from Tanjung Barulak, an area with poor water 
resources, to help with their own fields.
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gation systems and the rehabilitation and improvement of exisiting ones. Indeed, irriga­
tion improvement was a necessary concomitant of the government's plans for 
maximizing the potential of the HYVs. And, as in other spheres of development, the 
government designated itself the "prime mover" in the effort to improve irrigation 
facilities. During the first four Five-Year Development Plans (1967-1986), rehabilitation 
of existing systems and construction of new systems were given the highest priority in 
irrigation development. Central government commitment to irrigation has been 
extensive. As an example, in 1974/75, 44 percent of all subsidies from the central 
government to West Sumatra were earmarked for irrigation construction and 
maintenance.185 By 1982, 156,000 ha were included under Department of Public Works 
(PU) irrigation programs in West Sumatra.186 While this figure overestimates actual 
area, it does serve to illustrate the magnitude of the government's involvement in 
irrigation development in the province as compared to that of only fifteen years 
earlier.187
The number of systems with PU involvement in West Sumatra has quadrupled 
from 261 systems in 1967 to almost 1,000 in 1980.188 Nearly all of these systems were 
developed initially by farmers, many of them centuries ago. After they were assisted by 
the government they became de facto government systems, and the government now 
considers the structures to be government assets. According to PU figures, 59 percent of 
these government-assisted systems irrigate less than 150 hectares, accounting for 22 per­
cent of total government-assisted sawah area. Another 26 percent of PU systems irrigate 
command areas of between 151 and 300 hectares. Only 10 perecent of all PU systems in 
West Sumatra have designed command areas larger than 500 hectares.189 The scope of 
government assistance to irrigation in the province is now far greater than under either 
colonial rule or the early post-independence government.
With the exception of certain of the largest systems, the farmers in government- 
assisted irrigation systems, are, in effect, free to pursue any cropping schedule they wish. 
During the 1950s the post-colonial government in West Sumatra attempted to continue 
the Dutch plakaat sawah tradition, but violating the plakaat carried no sanctions, as it 
had under the Dutch, and eventually a formal planting schedule was dropped.190 The 
agricultural extension service still continues to promote simultaneous cropping to avoid 
pest problems, and a cropping schedule is sometimes issued from the Kabupaten-level 
civil administration, but the farmers are not sanctioned if they disregard the guidelines.
185R. Van Leeuwen, "Central Government Subsidies for Regional Development," BIES 11,1 (1975): 72.
186Direktorat Irigasi, Rekapitulasi buku pintar daerah irigasi PU Propinsi Sumatera Barat 1982 (henceforth 
RBPDF) (Jakarta: Departemen Pekerjaan Umum [DPU], 1982).
187The PU estimate is of actual irrigated area (sawah fungsional) as opposed to design area (sawah baku) 
which is much larger. Nevertheless, the estimate of sawah fungsional itself appears to be too large. See 
Ambler, "Management of Small-scale Irrigation."
188Asnawi and Shand, "Economic Impact of Irrigation," p. 110; and PU, "Inventarisasi Areal Pengairan dalam 
Lingkungan Dinas Pekerjaan Umum Dearah Tingkat I Sum-Bar, Tahun 1980," DPU Sumatera Barat, 1980. 
The latter figure refers to the official number of systems under the control of PU, but recent research indi­
cates that some of the smaller of these, although included in PU inventories, have in fact never received any 
PU assistance. See Ambler, "Management of Small-scale Irrigation."
189Calculated from RBPDI, 1983.
190Examples of post-independence plakaat sawah for various regions in West Sumatra can be found in Tani 6, 
7/8 (1959): 14-63. Recent attempts by PU to provide cropping schedules have been largely ineffective, accord­
ing to casual accounts.
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Government-assisted improvements in irrigation systems have been important in 
the drive for higher yields in West Sumatra, and the benefits of those improvements, at 
least in some systems, have more than offset the costs.191 Irrigation development pro­
grams in West Sumatra have not, however, been without problems, many of which 
stem from the difficulty in balancing the need to attend to the specific needs of individ­
ual irrigation systems with the urgent need to develop rapidly, and rehabilitate on a 
massive scale, the physical irrigation infrastructure, which had deteriorated through 
neglect and lack of funds during the 1950s and early 1960s. The pressing need to increase 
food production, and the availability of petro-dollars and international grants and loans 
to finance agricultural programs, beginning in the late 1960s, led the government to em­
bark on irrigation programs that emphasized a top-down approach. Government offi­
cials identified systems for rehabilitation; irrigation officials or private contractors pre­
pared the designs; contractors executed the construction of the rehabilitated facilities; and 
the irrigation staff was then sometimes placed in the system to perform key functions, 
such as operating gates and desilting canals. Farmers were often not consulted about 
these decisions, and they were sometimes treated as the object rather than the subject of 
development. This can be characterized as a "direct" investment approach.192
The results of direct investment were sometimes unfavorable. First was the quality 
of construction techniques used by outside contractors, which PU staff itself was 
inadequate to supervise. Inevitably many structures were built whose life was far shorter 
than anticipated. For example, contractors often either used inferior materials or failed to 
follow design specifications.
A second set of problems involved designs, which were standardized wherever pos­
sible. In some cases, these designs assumed a level of management that the farmers were 
not willing to provide. For example, the government design provides adjustable gates at 
the headworks of many systems, which assumes that someone will be there to operate 
the gates. In designing the intake, the point where the canal takes water from the river, 
however, the farmer design emphasizes prevention of excessive water coming into the 
canal, not by the use of rising stem gates, but by the provision of a portal through which 
the water must flow—when the water is low the portal does not obstruct the water, and 
when the river water is very high, the portal blocks too much water from coming into 
the canal and destroying it. With this design, no personnel are needed to monitor the 
intake. This is one example of how a farmer design was devised to regulate water auto­
matically, while the government design required placing of a full-time or part-time em­
ployee to watch over the gates.
A third problem derived from the specification of structures to be constructed or 
rehabilitated. Government projects sometimes paid little attention to what the farmers 
wanted done to their system. For example, the government would sometimes empha­
size headworks construction even in hilly areas where farmers gave canal lining a 
higher priority.
A fourth set of problems arose because in many cases only selected irrigation systems 
along a rivercourse were improved. Sometimes the improvements enabled selected
191Asnawi and Shand, "Economic Impact of Irrigation," p. 119.
192For a discussion of "direct" versus "indirect" investment strategies in irrigation, see E. Walter Coward, Jr., 
"Direct or Indirect Alternatives for Irrigation Investment and the Creation of Property," in Irrigation Invest­
ment, Technology, and Management Strategies for Development, ed. K. William Easter (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1986).
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systems to divert more water from the rivercourse than had previously been possible 
using simpler headworks. This changed the balance of intersystem water distribution, 
and often led to complaints from downstream systems that improved systems upstream 
had begun diverting too much water.
A fifth constellation of problems revolved around the farmers' increasing reliance 
on the government to improve and maintain the assisted systems. Whereas before 
assistance the farmers used to maintain the systems themselves through various forms 
of collective labor, after assistance they tended either to rely on resident PU personnel, or 
to wait for PU to provide periodic or incidental assistance when the system needed 
attention. The farmers' tendency to wait for PU to do a job they could do themselves was 
understandable because PU now considered the rehabilitated system as a government 
system. Thus, improving the physical aspects of formerly farmer-managed irrigation 
systems inadvertently created a dependency relationship between the farmers and the 
government, in which local mobilization of resources and action was retarded by the 
government assistance itself. This situation was often compounded by the fact that little 
attention was paid to the development of viable water users' associations in the 
rehabilitated systems.
Many of these deficiencies are a consequence of not involving farmers in decisions 
concerning their irrigation systems. In its haste to develop the physical infrastructure, 
the central government in the late 1960s chose to operate through a standardized direct 
approach which did not capitalize on local knowledge of conditions, needs, and 
desires.193 Involving farmers in the decision-making process could have assisted in 
identifying priorities for assistance, in developing designs appropriate to local social and 
ecological conditions, in involving farmers in the construction of their own system, and 
in strengthening farmer ownership and responsibility for subsequent maintenance of 
the system. Such a participatory approach, however, does require intensive communcia- 
tion between irrigation officials and fanners and the skills to view irrigation as a socio- 
technical set of phenomena, not just merely as a physical infrastructure.
Experiments with such "indirect" or "participatory" approaches to irrigation devel­
opment have been few in West Sumatra in recent years. Where tried, however, this 
approach has proven to be less costly than the traditional direct approach, and farmers 
are likely to have a greater stake in maintaining the system after construction, because 
they were involved in the entire process.194 At present, however, PU is ill-equipped to 
attempt this on an extensive scale.
The recent fiscal crisis has spurred efforts to redefine the government's role in irriga­
tion development and to move toward a more indirect investment approach. Since the 
decline in oil and gas revenues in the mid-1980s, the national budget has no longer been
193For a discussion of similar problems in an extensive irrigation development program for small-scale 
irrigation done in the 1970s, see USAID, "Sedcrhana: Indonesia Small-scale Irrigation," AID Project Impact 
Evaluation Report No. 29, February 1982. For an interpretation of one case study see S. Asnawi et al., Sebuah 
studi perbandingart, pp. 75-95.
194See, for example, two projects, Bt. Kajai and Bt. Air Baling, constructed under German Technical Assis­
tance. See "Laporan Akhir Proyek Irigasi Mini Batang Air Baling, Dcsa Hulu Pasaman, Kecamatan Talamau, 
Pasaman Barat," Area Development Project, West Pasaman, March 1987. Also, three irrigation systems were 
improved in West Sumatra by PU, in conjunction with funding from USAID, using a more participatory 
approach. For a description of the approach, see LP3ES, "Laporan akhir proyek percontohan pembinaan par- 
tisipasi petani dalam pembangunan dan pengelolaan irigasi sedcrhana melalui community organizer dalam 
rangka high performance sederhana irrigation system (HPS1S)," Jakarta: LP3ES.
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able to support the rising budgets for operations and maintenance needed by PU for the 
large number of systems it has taken over. Consequently, the priorities for irrigation 
development under the fifth Five-Year Development Plan (1987-1992) lay more stress 
on developing efficient operations and maintenance procedures and on collecting water 
users' fees than on new construction and rehabilitation. In line with this change of pol­
icy, as part of a large irrigation sector loan from the World Bank initiated in 1987, PU has 
also begun a program of turning over all irrigation systems under 500 ha to farmer water 
management groups within the next fifteen years. Many of these systems will receive 
construction assistance before the turnover. However, in contrast with its earlier 
approach, PU is now experimenting with approaches involving farmers in the planning, 
design, and execution phases of construction. In addition, PU plans to provide assistance 
to farmer groups to encourage water users' associations which could operate and main­
tain the irrigation systems, with a minimum of government assistance after the 
turnover. One of the major challenges PU now faces in West Sumatra is to develop 
these water users' groups, given that the traditional elite, which might normally consti­
tute the backbone of such organizations, has been weakened, in part by the government's 
own past non-participatory approaches to development.
It is interesting to note that, in many ways, the indirect style of assistance would mark 
a return to the policies of the Dutch toward small-scale irrigation during the last three 
decades of their rule. However, in contrast to the reasons behind the colonial policies, 
which were aimed largely at minimizing government expenditure, the present gov­
ernment's turnover policy, while also spurred by financial pressures, is in addition 
apparently taking into account the long-term maintenance benefits to be derived from 
involving farmers in the process of planning, design, and execution.
Now that the day-to-day management of many individual systems is being turned 
back to water users' groups, PU is also beginning to reformulate its role at the rivercourse 
level. This, too, recalls earlier Dutch policies; the van Tubergen report of seventy-five 
years ago recommended that the Dutch government play a role in rivercourse manage­
ment, but not become involved in the management of small systems themselves.
Despite these positive steps, in West Sumatra irrigation development must still take 
place within an administrative environment which is increasingly ill-equipped to deal 
with irrigation as the management of a scarce resource for which different groups in­
creasingly compete. There have been many changes in the administration of the nagari 
since World War II, involving the relationship between the wali nagari, the successor of 
the Dutch kepala negeri, and various forms of adat and people's representative councils 
at this level.195 The most important of these administrative changes, however, came 
with the enactment of a law in 1979 which eliminated the nagari as a political unit.196
The nagari had been composed of territorial units called jorong. These jorong were 
not independent entities and only had their fullest social meaning within the context of 
the nagari. Under the new law, each of these jorong was converted into an independent 
administrative unit called the desa. Thus, the 543 nagari of West Sumatra became 3,537
195See (1) Maklumat Residen Sumatcra Barat, no. 20/1946; (2) Peraturan Gubernur Sumatera Tengah, no. 
50/GP/1950; (3) Ketetapan Gubernur Sumatera Tengah, NO. E/G/1955; (4) Keputusan Gubernur Kepala 
Daerah Tk.I Sumatera Barat, no. 02/Dcsa/1963; and (5) Surat Keputusan Gubernur Kepala Daerah Propinsi 
Sumatcra Barat, no. 015/G.S.B./1968.
196Undang-undang no. 5,1979. The implementation of this law took place between 1980 and 1982.
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desa,197 which now form the lowest political unit, directly beneath the kecamatan in the 
administrative hierarchy. Each desa is headed by a kepala desa, who receives a low salary 
directly from the government. Although the kepala desa is selected through consultation 
of the pangulu of the jorong, his appointment is subject to ratification by the govern­
ment, just as the Dutch reserved the right to approve or veto the choice of the kepala 
negeri.198
In conjunction with the clan elders (ttiniak mamak), the wali nagari used to coordi­
nate and promote all important development projects in the nagari, whether they were 
initiated by the government, by individuals or organizations, or by the nagari council.199 
Now, the wali nagari and his staff have been eliminated. Property which was owned by 
the nagari administration is being turned over to the Kerapatan Adat Nagari (KAN),200 a 
consultative body composed of the men who occupy positions of traditional family lead­
ership.201
Many problems have arisen with the breakup of the nagari into desa. The first is an 
increased administrative burden on the camat, who has to monitor the greatly increased 
number of political units under him. (As an example, the 9 nagari in Kecamatan Lintau 
Buo in Tanah Datar were broken up into 86 desa after the reorganization.) Rather than 
use nagari administration as an intermediate level to remedy this problem, the govern­
ment has decided to create more kecamatan and thus reduce their size. Unlike the wali 
nagari, who was always chosen from among the niniak mamak within his own nagari, 
the camat is normally an outsider and therefore more removed from village-level con­
ditions.
Although the creation of the desa was not supposed to eliminate the nagari as a social 
adat unit ("kesatuan masyarakat hukum adat"),202 the relationship between the nagari 
and the desa has not been entirely clear under the new system.
The KAN (or Nagari Adat Council) was conceived as a way of dealing with nagari 
issues now that the position of wali nagari has been abolished. According to Perda 13, the 
duties of the KAN are: (1) to manage affairs which deal with hereditary titles, and prop­
erty;203 (2) to settle civil cases regarding adat and customary law; (3) to strive to bring 
peace and legal authority to disputes among the members of the nagari; (4) to promote 
the culture of the members of the nagari in order to preserve the regional culture and 
enrich the treasurehouse of national culture; (5) to inventory, guard, maintain, and uti­
lize the property of the nagari for the benefit of the members of the nagari; (6) to organize 
and coordinate the legal polity according to adat in each nagari, and to promote a high 
sense of family among the members of the nagari, increasing the level of social aware­
ness and community spirit; and (7) to represent the nagari, and to act in its name, in all
197SBDA, 1987, p. 23.
198This change was preceded by the establishment of unpaid kepala jorong or jorong heads under the nagari 
administration. See, Surat Keputusan Gubernur Sumatera Barat, 24 December, 1974, No, 155/G.S.B./1974, 
paragraph 26.
iyySee, for example, Harsja Bachtiar, 'Twelve Sumatran Villages" (MA thesis, Cornell University, 1959), pp. 
128,132.
^®The turning over of nagari property is still taking place. The implementation of this ordinance is some­
times slowed by confusion over what exactly constitutes nagari property.
^Olperaturan Daerah (Perda) no. 13/1983.
202Cf. the Dutch term "sociale gemeenschap."
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legal cases inside or outside the courts in matters regarding the rights and property of the 
nagari.
Apart from acting as a repository of knowledge and instruction on nagari adat, the 
primary function of the KAN then becomes the supervision of nagari property. How­
ever, in the government view, this "supervision" is normally limited to the utilization 
and inheritance of that property according to adat. Property improvement falls within 
the sphere of "pembangunan" ("development"), which in practice is normally consid­
ered the province of government agencies, not of adat institutions or adat leaders. Thus, 
while desiring the cooperation of adat institutions and leaders in promoting its devel­
opment plans, the government has effectively removed much of the economic content 
from the concept of adat.2Qi Under the Dutch, adat leaders were allowed to retain a role 
in the administration of adat, which although it no longer encompassed the overall 
organization of society, did include the organization of the economic base of both the 
European-dominated sector and village economy sectors.* 205 Under the new develop­
ment programs, however, adat leaders are increasingly left in control of adat merely in 
marginalized (that is, non-economic) sectors. The new leaders in the economic sector are 
not adat leaders but rather government civil servants.
There are several ramifications for irrigation in this administrative reorganization. 
First is the proliferation of administrative units now served by irrigation systems. For 
example, in Kecamatan Lintau Buo there were previously eleven government-assisted 
systems which irrigated land in more than one nagari. With the administrative breakup 
of the nagari, eight additional government systems now cross administrative boundaries. 
Some small systems now irrigate land in seven, eight, even nine desa. The shift in 
political power from the niniak mamak to the desa headmen, means that there is a 
tendency to parochialize the interests of the various desa served by these systems, raising 
the potential for conflict in management of the irrigation system.
Second, with the proliferation of desa, the problem of coordinating water use between 
systems utilizing the same river becomes heightened. The xvali nagari can no longer 
coordinate intersystem water allocation and distribution, while the bailiwick of the 
kepala desa is too small and that of the camat too large to handle intersystem water 
allocation. Intersystem coordination of water has always been one of the weaker aspects 
of Minangkabau irrigation,206 and this administrative change has exacerbated the prob­
lem.
A third problem caused by the breakup of the nagari has been the reduction of man­
power available for communal work projects (gotong royong). The institutions to mobi­
lize labor on a nagari level have now been severely weakened, promoting an atomiza­
tion of labor interests and a tendency to restrict gotong royong to the desa level. In the 
1920s each nagari had an average of about 600 working men who could be mobilized for 
gotong royong by the niniak mamak and wali nagari.2®' With the breakup of the nagari, 
landowners in one desa often have their land in another, so that one desa may have 
much labor for gotong royong but little land;208 while other desa, with large amounts of
2°4Cf. Asnawi et al., Sebuah studi perbandingan, pp. 90-91.
205See also Kahn, 'Tradition, Matriliny and Change," p. 86.
206See Ambler, "Management of Small-scale Irrigation."
207C. van Vollenhoven, Het adatrecht van Nederlandsch-lndie, vol. I (Leiden: Brill, 1931), p. 251.
208por example, in Kecamatan Lintau Buo, Tanah Da tar, Desa Kota Tapi Selo and Desa Nusa Indah, core 
jorong in Nagari Tapi Selo and Nagari Lubuk Jantan, are the places of residence for a large number of niniak
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sawah owned by people outside the desa may now find themselves with much land but 
little labor. Some desa now have as few as 30 able-bodied men,209 and the diversion of 
desa labor for government-sponsored gotong royong projects such as village and roadside 
beautification programs further reduces the available labor for productive projects such 
as irrigation.
Conclusions
During the last 200 years, the history of rice cultivation in West Sumatra has been 
one of commoditization in fits and starts. Although in precolonial times limited quanti­
ties of rice had been exported to eastern Sumatra via river routes and to the western 
coast via overland trails, it was not until Dutch colonization and improvements in road 
and rail transportation that large rice movements between districts and regions became 
practical. However, the potential for exporting rice over these new routes was fettered by 
the koffiestelsel. Whereas, given its natural resources and skilled rice farmers, West 
Sumatra should have been exporting rice, in fact, by the end of the nineteenth century it 
had become a rice importer. The irrigation infrastructure developed by Minangkabau 
farmers was capable of growing surplus rice, but early Dutch policies which intentionally 
kept the rice economy as much as possible on a subsistence basis, undermined develop­
ment of a vigorous economy which might have otherwise burgeoned under a rice sur­
plus situation, thus restricting West Sumatra's potential for agricultural development.
The world trade depression in the 1930s forced a return to rice and other basic food 
crops. Although the Dutch at that time actively promoted rice cultivation, gains in pro­
duction were offset by the increasing population. The rice import situation continued to 
worsen in the post-independence years.
Since the advent of the new rice varieties in the 1960s and 1970s, total rice production 
in West Sumatra has tripled. The scope for development of new sawah has been very 
limited in most of the province for at least a century, and higher yields and multiple 
cropping have been responsible for the huge increase in production—and for important 
increases in farmer incomes as well. Rice is now not only an article of consumption, but 
also a major article of trade, and the monetization of the rice production process has 
caused a major change in village economies. West Sumatra has now finally become the 
regional exporter of rice it should have been long ago.
The encouraging fact that production and incomes have increased, however, must be 
tempered by the assessment of the institutional development which should accompany 
such gains. Nagari members under the leadership of pangulu, acting as either lineage 
heads or nagari elders, were apparently responsible for developing the region's irrigation 
in precolonial times. With the possible exception of activities by the Padri in the early 
nineteenth century, there are no confirmed records of any supra-nagari political power 
being responsible for irrigation development during the precolonial period.
Yet this strong base of authority and cohesion in irrigated agriculture has been under 
continnual assault since colonial times. The Dutch occupation cost the nagari its auton­
omy. The equality of the pangulu was eroded as the Dutch elevated some pangulu above
mamak and other landowners from those nagari, but within the two desa proper there are only 6 and 15 ha of 
sawah respectively.
2^For example, Desa Duwek, Nagari Tanjung Bonai, Lintau Buo, Tanah Datar.
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others to facilitate colonial governance from Padang and Batavia. Limits were put on the 
creation of new pangulu, while the Dutch also invested the existing pangulu with power 
far beyond that conferred by adat. The integrity of the pangulu was strained as the Dutch 
government pressured them to force their people to grow export crops for Dutch 
monopolies, and many pangulu became tools of the colonial administration. By the time 
the Dutch belatedly tried to separate the functions of the civil administration from adat 
leadership, the prestige of the pangulu had been severely eroded. Paradoxically, in trying 
to strengthen the indigenous Minangkabau administrative system, the Dutch under­
mined the very foundations of adat-based authority.210
Although Indonesian governments since independence have wished to preserve the 
adat functions of the pangulu, they have inadvertently continued the process of "de-adat- 
ization" of leadership at the village level. Issues of "development"—including irriga­
tion—have been increasingly moved into the hands of civil servants and out of the 
hands of traditional leaders. Past linkages between civil and adat roles are being struc­
turally weakened as well, as evidenced by the recent abolition of the nagari as a unit of 
political administration. These events have placed traditional leadership in a passive 
role and have not encouraged dialogue between adat heads and the agents of change 
from government ministries. With specific regard to irrigation development, the lack of 
consultation which characterizes many state programs has led to a further dimunition of 
the prestige of the pangulu. The irrigated rice fields of the lineage, the traditional 
trusteeship of adat leadership, are in many cases being developed by a government 
which is not directly accountable to the irrigators whose fields its policies affect.
The conceptual and practical disadvantages encountered from this direct investment 
style in small irrigation systems—and the rising operations and maintenance budget 
required to operate and maintain them—have recently led the government to begin a 
program of returning government-assisted small-scale systems to farmer water-user 
groups. It is hoped that this new policy will enable farmers to do what they do best—irri­
gate—while at the same time reorient the government's irrigation department away 
from the role of an administrative and executive agency and toward one of a service 
agency. While farmer water groups are still in a tenuous legal position, this new policy 
does represent a significant and positive first step in decentralizing some state control 
over agricultural development and moves toward empowering farmers to make deci­
sions which affect their livelihood. Nevertheless, with the weakening of institutions for 
handling inter-Hagan and intersystem water distribution, intergroup competition for 
irrigation water in West Sumatra is likely to continue to be a major problem.
210See Amran, Sumatera Barat, pp. 187-208. Similar problems in Bengkulu are described in J. Kathirithamby- 
Wells, "A Survey of the Effects of British Influence on Indigenous Authority in South West Sumatra (1685— 
1824)/' BKI129 (1973): 239-68.
